Summary: (a) Constitutional jurisdiction ----Art. 199, Constitution of Pakistan—Scope in rent matters—Concurrent findings of fact—Standard for interference ---- High Court, while exercising constitutional jurisdiction under Art.199, cannot substitute its own view on disputed facts or re-appraise evidence unless the subordinate fora’s concurrent findings suffer from gross misreading/non-reading of material evidence, are perverse, or are unsupported by the record—Interference with well-reasoned concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and Appellate Authority holding that arrears were not proved was impermissible. Fozia Mazhar v. ADJ Jhang (PLD 2024 SC 771) followed; State Life Insurance v. Jaffar Hussain (2009 CLD 610) and Allies Book Corporation v. Sultan Ahmad (2006 SCMR 152) reiterated. (b) Rent laws ----West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, S.13(2)(i)—Non-payment of rent—Limitation/laches—Burden Where tenancy admittedly expired in 2016 and ejectment proceedings for non-payment were instituted in 2020 without explanation, claim for arrears was hit by the statutory scheme and laches—In absence of acknowledgment or revival of tenancy, arrears could not be granted for the interceding period. (c) Evidence—Best evidence rule; adverse inference; ex parte proceedings ----Qanun-e-Shahadat—Uncorroborated affidavit—Withholding material witness—Effect Landlord’s sole reliance on an uncorroborated affidavit (Exh. PW-1/1) and failure to examine the person (“Saleem”) allegedly assuring continued possession constituted withholding of best evidence, attracting an adverse inference—Mere ex parte status of the tenant does not shift the legal burden; claimant must affirmatively prove continued possession/use and arrears—Shop being found locked, with no proof of use or benefit by tenant, disentitled landlord to arrears. (d) Rent control—Ejectment vs. arrears ----Concurrent findings restored Controller rightly allowed ejectment but declined arrears for want of proof; Appellate Authority concurred—High Court’s grant of rent for 2016–2024, absent proof of possession or subsisting tenancy, was contrary to settled principles and set aside. Cited Cases: • Fozia Mazhar v. ADJ Jhang PLD 2024 SC 771 • State Life Insurance v. Jaffar Hussain 2009 CLD 610 • Allies Book Corporation v. Sultan Ahmad 2006 SCMR 152 Disposition: Petition converted into appeal and allowed; High Court judgment dated 11.10.2024 set aside; judgments of the Rent Controller (21.06.2021) and Appellate Authority (28.10.2022) restored—Ejectment maintained; claim for arrears declined. Approved for reporting; announced in open Court on 29.09.2025.

Summary: Capital Development Authority Ordinance (XXIII of 1960)--- ----S. 36(3)---Islamabad Residential Sectors Zoning (Building Control) Regulations, 2005, Regln.2.17.3---Review---Jurisdiction---Non-confirming use of property---Petitioner / Capital Development Authority was aggrieved of order passed by Deputy Commissioner, who in exercise of powers of Commissioner had reviewed his earlier order and penalty imposed upon respondent / owner of the property was set aside on the allegation of non-confirming use of property in question---Validity---Scope of review under S.36(3) of Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960, is narrowly circumscribed and is limited to correcting clerical, arithmetical or patent errors---Deputy Commissioner in exercise of powers of Commissioner re-examined factual controversies already adjudicated upon and by substituting his own findings for those of Deputy Commissioner, transgressed jurisdictional limits of review---Such reasoning suffered from jurisdictional infirmity and amounted to illegal exercise of authority---Order in question passed in review, could not be sustained in the eyes of law, as the same was contrary both to the statutory scheme and to settled judicial principles regulating the scope of review---High Court set aside the order passed in review as the same suffered from inherent lack of jurisdiction---High Court remanded the matter to Deputy Commissioner to decide the matter afresh after providing opportunity of hearing to parties---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. ������ Awais Aslam Ali through Representative v. Capital Development Authority and another 2024 YLR 1422 and Mrs. Shamshad Butt v. Deputy Commissioner C.D.A., Islamabad and 3 others 2023 CLC 304 ref. ������ Kashif Ahmad Khan for Petitioner. ������ Abdullah Malik, Nauman Munir Paracha and Arslan Khan Burki for Respondent No. 1. ������ Date of hearing: 10th September, 2025.

Summary: Customs Act (IV of 1969)- Saeed Akram, Member (Legal), Ashraf Ali, Chief Legal, Customs, Amanat Kha, ADC and Aftab Alam, Inspector for the Department Customs.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan- -Arts. 25(3) & 34-Protection of women-Gender based discrimination-Effect-Battle for gender justice has been long-drawn struggle-Gender based discrimination reveals ugly face of society, which is prohibited under the Constitution-Insertion of clause (3) of Art.25 of the Constitution in relation to women is recognition of fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped and as a result were unable to participate in socio-economic activities of the nation on a footing of equality-It is in the order to eliminate socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that sub-cluse (3) was placed in Art.25 of the Constitution-Object of Art.25(3) of the Constitution is to strengthen and improve status of women-Duty has been cast upon State under Art.34 of the Constitution that steps should be taken to ensure full participation of women in all spheres of national life-Making special provisions for women is an integral part of Art.25 (3) of the Constitution. (b) Constitution of Pakistan- -Art. 25-Employment-Gender based discrimination-Petitioner was aggrieved of restricting female candidates from participating in selection process of Prosecuting Inspectors-Held: Practice of debarring women from holding positions of Prosecuting Inspector not only contravened the principles of justice and equality but also perpetuated patriarchal norms, misogyny and outdated societal customs-It was time to shatter such age-old barriers and uphold the progressive and forward-looking Constitutional ideals of liberty, equality and social justice-We should bid farewell to gender biases and prejudices and instead pave the way for realization of such steadfast Constitutional principles by welcoming women's participation in all aspects of life with honour and dignity-Condition laid down in selection process was tantamount to discrimination which was not permissible under the Constitution and had gone against the Constitutional mandate of equality and safeguarding against discrimination in service-High Court declared the condition whereby only male candidates were declared eligible and female had been debarred as illegal and un-Constitutional-High Court directed Balochistan Public Service Commission to re-advertise the posts of Prosecuting Inspectors, inviting all interested candidates without any discrimination-High Court directed Balochistan Government to take immediate steps to strengthen the office of Public Service Commission on the status of women in order to eliminate all forms of discrimination in existing laws-Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. Surat An-Nisa' - Ayat 32; Hadith, the Holy Prophet (saw); I.A. Sharwani v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance Division Islamabad 1991 SCMR 1041; Civil Petitions Nos. 1347 and 1655 of 2019; Gul Sher v. Additional Sessions Judge Bhowana PLD 2023 Lah. 171; Ishrat Batool v. Government of Punjab 2018 PLC (C.S.) N 165; Talat Haleem v. Principal BMC PLD 2015 Quetta 97; C.P. No. 955 of 2022 and Reed v. Reed 1971 rel. Petitioner in person. Shai Haq Baloch, Additional Advocate General for State / Respondents.

Summary: (Against Judgment dated 15.09.2022 of Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in W.P. No. 19-P of 2022). Customs Act (IV of 1969)--- ----S. 169(5)---Wrong seizure/confiscation of goods, plea of---Sale proceeds---Claim in terms of Section 169(5) of the Customs Act, 1969---Scope---Declaration/ findings by Adjudication Authority /Court not obtained---Effect---Petitioner presented his claim for recovery of sale proceeds of black tea---Held: Section 169(5) of the Customs Act, 1969,stipulates that if on adjudication or in an appeal or proceedings in court, the goods sold are found not to be liable to such confiscation, the entire sale proceeds (after necessary deduction of duties, taxes or dues as provided in Section 201 of the Customs Act, 1969) shall be handed over to the owner---In the present case, the petitioner was yet to obtain such declaration or findings of the court on adjudication and had directly jumped to claim the sale proceeds of confiscated goods---Thus, in order to have the benefit of the sale proceeds under the Customs Act, 1969, the declaration of being an owner of wrongly seized/confiscated goods was inevitable , which could only be passed on to the owner if the owner was able to establish either on adjudication, appeal or proceedings in court that the goods sold were not liable to such confiscation---Petition for eave to appeal, being merit-less, was dismissed, in circumstances. Farhat Nawaz Lodhi, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner. Abdul Rauf Rohaila, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Usman Aziz, Deputy Collector, Customs for Respondents (through video-link from Peshawar). Saeed Akram, Member (Legal), Ashraf Ali, Chief Legal, Customs, Amanat Kha, ADC and Aftab Alam, Inspector for the Department Customs. Date of hearing: 25th September, 2025.

Summary: (Against Judgment dated 15.09.2022 of Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in W.P. No. 19-P of 2022). Customs Act (IV of 1969)--- ----S. 169(5)---Wrong seizure/confiscation of goods, plea of---Sale proceeds---Claim in terms of Section 169(5) of the Customs Act, 1969---Scope---Declaration/ findings by Adjudication Authority /Court not obtained---Effect---Petitioner presented his claim for recovery of sale proceeds of black tea---Held: Section 169(5) of the Customs Act, 1969,stipulates that if on adjudication or in an appeal or proceedings in court, the goods sold are found not to be liable to such confiscation, the entire sale proceeds (after necessary deduction of duties, taxes or dues as provided in Section 201 of the Customs Act, 1969) shall be handed over to the owner---In the present case, the petitioner was yet to obtain such declaration or findings of the court on adjudication and had directly jumped to claim the sale proceeds of confiscated goods---Thus, in order to have the benefit of the sale proceeds under the Customs Act, 1969, the declaration of being an owner of wrongly seized/confiscated goods was inevitable, which could only be passed on to the owner if the owner was able to establish either on adjudication, appeal or proceedings in court that the goods sold were not liable to such confiscation---Petition for eave to appeal, being merit-less, was dismissed, in circumstances. Farhat Nawaz Lodhi, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner. Abdul Rauf Rohaila, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Usman Aziz, Deputy Collector, Customs for Respondents (through video-link from Peshawar). Saeed Akram, Member (Legal), Ashraf Ali, Chief Legal, Customs, Amanat Kha, ADC and Aftab Alam, Inspector for the Customs Department. Date of hearing: 25th September, 2025.

Summary: ----Preamble & S. 2---Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (XL of 2016), S.37(1)---Removal and Blocking of Unlawful Online Content (Procedure, Oversight and Safeguards) Rules, 2021, Rr.4 & 5---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts.4(c), 19, 25 & 199---Constitutional petition by entertainment broadcasting companies---Unequal enforcement of censorship and certification laws, plea of---Grievance---Cinema films requiring prior certification while identical OTT/digital content remaining unregulated and freely accessible---Legality---Brief facts were that the petitioner companies were entertainment broadcasting companies operating a chain of cinemas across the country, duly licensed to exhibit films under the Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979---They filed a constitutional petition alleging unequal enforcement of censorship and certification laws, arguing that while films screened in cinemas were subject to prior certification by the Central Board of Film Censors, identical content available on digital and OTT platforms such as Netflix or Amazon Prime were freely accessible in the country without similar regulation---The petition also challenged the applicability of the Import Policy Order, 2022 to digital film content, asserting that digital imports did not constitute “goods” under the law-- -Petitioner companies sought directions for uniform application of the Motion Pictures Ordinance to all mediums of exhibition, including online platforms, and alternatively requested that any unrestrained film content available online be deemed certified for public exhibition in their cinemas---Core question for determination before the High Court was as to “Whether the Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979 applied to Over-the-Top (OTT) digital platforms and whether content available online, if unregulated by the Central Board of Film Censors, could be deemed certified for public exhibition in cinemas”?---Held: The procedure provided under Rr. 4 & 5 of the Removal and Blocking of Unlawful Online Content (Procedure, Oversight and Safeguards) Rules, 2021 primarily addressed online content based on complaints, however, S. 4(6) of the Rules also allowed the authority to act on its own initiative to remove or block unlawful online content under S. 37(1) of the Act, even without a formal complaint---While acknowledging the PTA‘s statutory authority to block access to unlawful online content under S. 37(1) of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016 and R. 5(6) of the Removal and Blocking of Unlawful Online Content (Procedure, Oversight and Safeguards) Rules, 2021, there was a critical distinction---Though a platform might be blocked entirely, the granular, pre-screening censorship of individual content items, as was done for traditional films to be exhibited through cinematograph, was not practically achievable due to the encrypted nature and sheer volume of data streaming over such protocols---The authority‘s recourse in such scenarios was often limited to a complete blocking of the platform or engaging with content providers, rather than undertaking a proactive, content-by-content review---The distinctions between exhibition of films by means of cinematograph and content on OTT platforms reflected fundamental differences in content creation, distribution, consumption patterns and the practicalities of regulation---Therefore, High Court could not expand the scope of the Ordinance, designed for a different technological epoch and mode of consumption, to encompass a modern, dynamic digital medium---The Motion Pictures Ordinance of 1979 did not apply to content on Over-the-Top (OTT) platforms because these platforms did not exist when the Ordinance was promulgated---As the Ordinance was neither designed to regulate digital content on OTT platforms nor amended to meet such new exigencies, compelling its application through judicial order would impose an obligation not required by law as articulated under Art. 4(c) of the Constitution---With respect to the alternative prayer of the petitioner companies that if respondents did not restrain OTT platforms content, such unrestrained content be considered certified and allowed for public exhibition, to declare all such unrestrained content “certified” by default would create a regulatory vacuum, allowing potentially objectionable or unlawful content to be exhibited without any prior scrutiny or classification---The question of whether digital content constituted “goods” for import purposes was primarily one for customs, trade, and taxation authorities---However, irrespective of its classification under import policies, once such content was sought to be publicly exhibited within the territorial limits of Pakistan via cinemas, it immediately engaged the State‘s power to regulate public displays for the maintenance of public order, morality and other societal interests---The nature of the medium of exhibition (cinema) produced distinct regulatory requirements under domestic law (including the Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979 for cinematographs), which could not be circumvented by arguing the digital origin or non-import status of the content itself---Therefore, even if the content was not deemed an “import of goods” in the traditional sense, its public exhibition in a cinema required adherence to the laws governing public exhibition, which necessitated proper certification---In the present case, cinematographs and OTT platforms were not “similarly circumstanced” entities under the purview of the Ordinance---A cinematograph involved a distinct mode of exhibition in a public setting, demanding physical infrastructure, controlled access and a regulatory framework built for a pre-digital era---Conversely, OTT platforms operated as digital streaming services, delivering a vast, dynamic and globally sourced content library primarily for private consumption on diverse personal devices---The Ordinance was never designed nor enacted to regulate the latter---Therefore, the mere absence of its application to OTT platforms, which operated under a fundamentally different technological and consumption paradigm, did not constitute a discriminatory application of the same law---The State‘s challenge lay in a legislative vacuum for modern digital media, not in a discriminatory enforcement of an existing law on entities that were, in fact, distinct in their nature and mode of operation---Prayer seeking the application of the Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979 to OTT platforms and the alternate prayer for deemed certification of unrestrained content, were not maintainable on legal and practical grounds---Both the petitions were, therefore, dismissed, in circumstances. British Amusement Catering Trades Association and another v. Westminster City Council ([1988] 1 All ER (sic) ref. (b) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Once the meaning of an expression is provided in a statute, that interpretation tends to stick rigidly to that original understanding, even if times or circumstances evolve. Commissioner of Income Tax Legal Division, Lahore and others v. Khurshid Ahmad and others PLD 2016 SC 545 and Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan through President and another v. Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Interior Islamabad and others PLD 2023 SC 42 rel. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ---Art.25---Discrimination, plea of---Applicability---Scope---The essence of legal discrimination, particularly in the context of guarantee of equality as enshrined in Art. 25 of the Constitution, applies where similarly circumstanced entities are treated differently under the same law, or where distinctions are drawn without reasonable justification among equal. I.A. Sharwani and others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance Division, Islamabad and others 1991 SCMR 1041 and Gul Zarif Khan and others v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary, Peshawar and others 2025 SCMR 415 rel. Muhammad Ali Raza, Habiba Alvi, Jawad Ul Hassan and Raza Ahmad for Petitioners. Muhammad Mansoor Ali Sial, Assistant Attorney General for the Federation of Pakistan. Amar Sana, Additional Advocate General and Muhammad Osman Khan, Assistant Advocate General for the Province of Punjab. Syed Nayyer Abbas Rizvi with Umer Khatab, Deputy Director Legal, PEMRA for Respondent No.2/PEMRA. Barrister Ch. Muhammad Umar and Mufti Ahtesham-ud-Din Haider for Respondent No.3/PTA. Zeeshan Zafar Hashmi, Amicus Curiae. Dates of hearing: 21st, 22nd 23rd June, 2023, 04th June, 2024 and 8th April, 2025. RAHEEL KAMRAN, J.--- This judgment shall decide the titled petition as well as Writ Petition No.27810 of 2023 since common questions of law and facts are involved therein.

Summary: ----Arts. 25(3) & 34---Protection of women---Gender based discrimination---Effect---Battle for gender justice has been long-drawn struggle--- Gender based discrimination reveals ugly face of society, which is prohibited under the Constitution---Insertion of clause (3) of Art.25 of the Constitution in relation to women is recognition of fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped and as a result were unable to participate in socio-economic activities of the nation on a footing of equality---It is in the order to eliminate socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that sub-cluse (3) was placed in Art.25 of the Constitution---Object of Art.25(3) of the Constitution is to strengthen and improve status of women---Duty has been cast upon State under Art.34 of the Constitution that steps should be taken to ensure full participation of women in all spheres of national life--- Making special provisions for women is an integral part of Art.25 (3) of the Constitution. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 25---Employment---Gender based discrimination---Petitioner was aggrieved of restricting female candidates from participating in selection process of Prosecuting Inspectors---Held: Practice of debarring women from holding positions of Prosecuting Inspector not only contravened the principles of justice and equality but also perpetuated patriarchal norms, misogyny and outdated societal customs---It was time to shatter such age-old barriers and uphold the progressive and forward-looking Constitutional ideals of liberty, equality and social justice---We should bid farewell to gender biases and prejudices and instead pave the way for realization of such steadfast Constitutional principles by welcoming women’s participation in all aspects of life with honour and dignity---Condition laid down in selection process was tantamount to discrimination which was not permissible under the Constitution and had gone against the Constitutional mandate of equality and safeguarding against discrimination in service---High Court declared the condition whereby only male candidates were declared eligible and female had been debarred as illegal and un-Constitutional---High Court directed Balochistan Public Service Commission to re-advertise the posts of Prosecuting Inspectors, inviting all interested candidates without any discrimination---High Court directed Balochistan Government to take immediate steps to strengthen the office of Public Service Commission on the status of women in order to eliminate all forms of discrimination in existing laws---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. Surat An-Nisa' - Ayat 32; Hadith, the Holy Prophet (saw); I.A. Sharwani v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance Division Islamabad 1991 SCMR 1041; Civil Petitions Nos. 1347 and 1655 of 2019; Gul Sher v. Additional Sessions Judge Bhowana PLD 2023 Lah. 171; Ishrat Batool v. Government of Punjab 2018 PLC (C.S.) N 165; Talat Haleem v. Principal BMC PLD 2015 Quetta 97; C.P. No. 955 of 2022 and Reed v. Reed 1971 rel. Petitioner in person. Shai Haq Baloch, Additional Advocate General for State / Respondents. Date of hearing: 7th September, 2023. (e) in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality, the Court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation;

Summary: Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. XXXVII, Rr.2 & 3---Suit for recovery of money---Dishonored cheques---Security cheques---Proof---Appellant / plaintiff company was aggrieved of dismissal of its suit seeking recovery of money on the basis of five cheques valuing Rs.1,496,480/---Validity---There was not only business relationship acknowledged, but cheques in question could not have been issued merely as security---Cheques in question represented subsisting and admitted liability arising from services actually rendered---Appellant/plaintiff, was entitled to claim entire sum covered by the cheques, or that amount which had been acknowledged through letter dated 06-10-2007 exhibited by appellant / plaintiff which had confined its suit only to Rs.934,491.90, a figure consistent with reconciled balance after adjusting payments made by respondent / defendant---Such fortified bona fides of the claim of appellant/plaintiff had demonstrated that Trial Court failed to correctly appreciate evidence on record---On proper appraisal of record and issues which were core point of determination, suit should have been decided in favour of appellant / plaintiff---Admitted issuance of cheques coupled with the established course of dealings proved the claim of appellant / plaintiff---Respondent / defendant failed to substantiate its defence, hence, Trial Court’s conclusion was legally flawed---High Court set aside judgment and decree passed by Trial Court and decreed the suit of appellant / plaintiff---Appeal was allowed accordingly. Shakeel Javaid Chaudhry for Appellant. Malik Tariq Saeed for Respondents. Date of hearing: 8th September, 2025.

Summary: An agreement for construction of a canal was executed between the parties wherein an exclusive modus operandi regarding fixing of the rate of cement in D.G. Khan was according to the Bulletin of the Federal Bureau of Statistics Pakistan whereas the Contractor unilaterally avoided the settled mode by collecting price from private shopkeepers/stockist and breached the contract and even did not prove the rate of cement by producing the scriber of said document. Appellant's suit against recovery of the amount was dismissed by the trial court. The instant appeal is also dismissed. 238Crl. Misc. 36163/25 Muhammad Ishaque Vs Zafar Iqbal etc Mr. Justice Ali Zia Bajwa 25- 09- 2025 2025 LHC 5784