Summary: Pakistan Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Rules, 1976--- ----R. 149---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 29, 30 & 199--- Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.23 ---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Compromise between the litigants and lawyer qua transfer of certain land as remuneration/professional legal fee---Legality---Issuance of notification by Revenue Department declaring the land settlement work carried out in the concerned Mauza as null and void---Principle of laches---Claim of the petitioner/lawyer was that Fard qua the land mutated to him in lieu of remuneration was not issued to him---Validity---Petitioner, who was a practicing lawyer, had himself admitted that he had received the property in question in lieu of his remuneration, which R. 149 of the Pakistan Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Rules, 1976 (Rules) had specifically prohibited, thus, the transaction carried out was not only against R. 149 of the Rules, but against the Principles of Policy enshrined in Arts. 29 & 30 of the Constitution, as the consideration in the agreement between the petitioner, as a practicing lawyer, and certain litigants was unlawful in view of said Rule---Thus, the said agreement was void in terms of S. 23 of the Contract Act, 1872---Petitioner had not uttered a single word about the status of the original property owners of the property in question---Since the petitioner had derived his title from the plaintiffs of the civil suit/original owners, thus, it was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that in fact the said owners, in the subsequent settlement proceedings, were also declared as owners, as the petitioner, on his own, had not asserted any ancestral right in the property---Petitioner had the knowledge of the notification, but even then instead of challenging the same, accepted the same and participated in the settlement proceedings, so subsequently, when his name was not incorporated as the owner of certain land, he at a belated stage challenged the notification without explaining the legal justification of such long delay, thus, the petition suffered from laches---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Tahir Ali Baloch along with Petitioner for Petitioner. Zahoor Ahmed Baloch, Additional Advocate-General for Respondents. Date of hearing: 14th November, 2024.

Summary: ----Ss. 173 & 561-A---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 324---Report of police officer---Addition or deletion of legal provision---Scope---Applicant was aggrieved of an order passed by Magistrate whereby charge under S. 324, P.P.C., was deleted---In a positive report of Investigating Officer referring the accused to a trial, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to disagree with him by disposing of the case or deleting a particular Section---Conclusion drawn by the Investigating Officer that there is sufficient material to show that a particular offence or the case as reported has been made out for the Court to hold a trial thereon is always based on some material collected by him during investigation---Magistrate was not competent to discard such report on taking a summary tour of material before him, which required examination of witnesses---Therefore, it will be for the Court, be it Magistrate's trial or the Sessions' trial, to apply its mind, in the trial and decide whether the case is made out; or there is sufficient material to attract applicability of a particular Section and then follow the procedure accordingly---Magistrate's power to disagree with the opinion of Investigating Officer is limited to only reports disposing of the case or deleting a particular Section---In such cases, the Magistrate by going through the material can form his own opinion disagreeing with the opinion of Investigating Officer and take cognizance of offence against the accused by accepting the Challan or restoring the deleted provision---In the present case, Magistrate without applying his mind had passed the order---Therefore, with consent, of the parties the impugned order was set aside and the case was remanded for passing a fresh order---Application along with pending application was disposed of accordingly. Muhammad Nasir Cheema v. Mazhar Javaid and others PLD 2007 SC 31; Amanat Ali v. Ist Civil Judge and J.M Daharki and others 2015 YLR 2312 and Rab Nawaz v. The State and others 2017 PCr.LJ Note 195 ref. 1972 SCMR 516; 1983 SCMR 370; 2010 YLR 470 and 2015 YLR 2312 rel. Syed Tanveer Abbas Shah and Badaruddin Memon along with Applicants for Applicants. Anwar Ali Lohar files power on behalf of Respondents Nos.3 to 13. Shafi Muhammad Mahar, Deputy P.G for the State. Date of hearing: 26th February, 2024.

Summary: ----Ss. 115, 151, O.VII, R. 14 & O. XIII, Rr. 1, 2---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 42, 8 & 54---Suit for declaration, possession and permanent injunction---Application for production of document, rejection of---Delay in filing the application---Good cause, presence of---Petitioner assailed the order of rejection of application--- Held: Order XIII, Rule 2, C.P.C. provided a remedy when a party failed to produce documents under O. XIII, R. 1 or O. VII, R. 14, C.P.C., which laid down that documentary evidence not produced as required should only be received if good cause for non-production was shown to the court's satisfaction, and the court must record its reasons for admitting such evidence---Mere delay in filing is not sufficient cause to disallow the document production, negating the purpose of O. XIII, R. 2, C.P.C.---Application to produce documents or additional evidence can be filed at any stage, especially when document's genuineness is certain---Such evidence should not be excluded if produced late---Court has discretion to admit documents at a later stage to ensure justice and decide rights on merits, not on technicalities---If document authenticity is not in doubt, the application should not be lightly dismissed, as procedures aim to advance justice, not obstruct it--- Civil revision was accepted, in circumstances. Muhammad Naeem Kakar for Petitioners. Adnan Ejaz for Respondents Nos. 1 to 21. Ameer Zaman Jogezai for Respondents Nos. 22 to 23. Date of hearing: 10th October, 2024.

Summary: ----O. VI, R. 17---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 42---Suit for declaration and partition of joint properties---Application for amendment of plaint---Proposed amendment not specified with exactitude---Plaintiffs filed an application under O. VI, R. 17 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 ('C.P.C.') praying for necessary amendments in the plaint---Trial Court dismissed the application of the petitioners/ plaintiffs---Petitioners/plaintiffs filed constitutional petition as their revision petition was also dismissed---Validity---Provisions of O. VI, R. 17, C.P.C., empower any party to a suit to alter or amend its pleadings in such manner as may be just; from the said requirement of law, it is clear that any party to a litigation is supposed to be clear and categoric in what it/they are praying to be inserted in already filed pleadings by way of amendment---For this, an applicant(s) under O. VI, R. 17, C.P.C. should indicate in clear terms as to which part of the pleadings, it/they intend to add or delete and in case of addition, proposed addition must be provided in unequivocal terms---Proposed amendment must not be vague or evasive---In the present case, the application moved by the petitioners/plaintiffs seeking amendment, it was difficult to ascertain, with some exactitude, as to what was required to be added in the already filed plaint and at which part of the plaint---The wording used in R. 17 of O. VI, C.P.C., clearly suggests that relevant portions of the pleadings must be pointed out by the person(s), intending to cause any amendment in the pleadings, and the portion, which is to be inserted as a result of alteration or amendment is concerned, should be specifically provided---The application moved by the petitioners/plaintiffs was lacking completely in this regard---Nowhere in the application, any proposed amendment, in clear terms, had been provided and similarly, it was not mentioned as to in which part of the already filed plaint, the proposed amendment was to be added or altered---General prayer for amendment cannot be made or allowed and such proposed amendment should be in writing and in explicit form and in the same way, order if allowing amendment should also be specific and clear showing nature and extent of amendment allowed---No illegality or irregularity had been noticed on the part of the Courts below while dismissing the application moved by the petitioners/plaintiffs, seeking amendment in the plaint---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Matwali Khan v. Shah Zaman and others PLD 1965 AJ&K 26 ref. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. VI, R. 17---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 42---Suit for declaration and partition of joint properties---Second application for amendment of plaint---Plaintiffs filed an application under O. VI, R. 17 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 ('C.P.C.') praying for necessary amendments in the plaint---Trial Court dismissed the application of the petitioners/plaintiffs---Petitioners/plaintiffs filed constitutional petition as their revision petition was also dismissed---Validity---Record revealed that prior to the present application, the petitioners/plaintiffs sought amendment, which was allowed and in the present application same facts were narrated by them, which showed that they were lingering on the matter on one pretext or the other---Petitioners/ plaintiffs had not made out their case for amendment in the already filed plaint and also failed to point out as to how the present amendment would be relevant, especially, when they filed the same fact in the application, which was allowed---No illegality or irregularity had been noticed on the part of the Courts below while dismissing the application moved by the petitioners/plaintiffs, seeking amendment in the plaint---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Muhammad Arshad Aziz for Petitioners. Chaudhary Sri Chand for Respondents Nos. 1 to 1-G and 2 to 8. Changaiz Dashti, Assistant Advocate General for Respondents Nos. 10 to 12. Date of hearing: 20th March, 2024.

Summary: ----Ss. 19 & 20---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 99-A & 298-C---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10-A---Cancellation of declaration of magazine---Due process of law---Preaching of faith by Qadiani group---Appellant was aggrieved of cancellation of declaration of magazine in question for publishing objectionable material---Plea raised by appellant was that declaration of magazine was cancelled on recommendations of Muttehida Ulema Board which had no authority in such regard---Validity---On receipt of material record/information the authorities after application of judicious mind issued show cause notice to appellant to appear and explain his position on the allegation regarding preaching of Qadianiat through magazine in question---Appellant appeared before authorities, filed reply and was also heard by authorities before passing order in question as envisaged in Art.10-A of the Constitution as well as mandated by S. 19 of Press, Newspapers, News Agencies and Books Registration Ordinance, 2002---Recommendations made by Muttehida Ulema Board as well as notification issued by Home Department were not questioned before any competent forum---Recommendations were in active knowledge of appellant, which had attained finality---Appellant through publishing objectionable material in magazine in question committed violation of law and authorities had rightly cancelled declaration of the magazine in question---High Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction declined to interfere in order passed by authorities as it was well-reasoned---Appellant failed to point out any illegality, material irregularity or jurisdictional defect in the order---Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances. Fahad Malik for Appellant. Raja Muhammad Arif, Additional Advocate General for Respondents. Date of hearing: 30th April, 2024.

Summary: (On appeal against the judgments dated 03.02.2022, 20.08.2021 passed by the Islamabad High Court in I.C.A. No. 527 of 2016 and W.Ps. Nos. 3573, 3427, 3428, 3421, 3222, 3145, 3237, 3254, 3893, 3647, 3756 and 3422 of 2021 and 2949 of 2021). (a) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Scope---High Courts do not have suo motu jurisdiction and as such the constitutional scheme never intended to confer such powers on the High Courts---High Court cannot assume suo motu jurisdiction by overreaching or overstretching its constitutional limits. Sadiq Poultry (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa PLD 2023 SC 236; Mian Irfan Bashir v. Deputy Commissioner, Lahore PLD 2021 SC 571; Raja Muhammad Nadeem v. The State PLD 2020 SC 282; Jahanzaib Malik v. Balochistan Public Procurement Regulatory Authority 2018 SCMR 414; Imran Khattak v. Sofia Waqar Khattak 2014 SCMR 122; Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. Muhammad Habib Wahab Al-Khairi 2000 SCMR 1046; Abdullah Jumani v. Province of Sindh 2024 SCMR 1258 and Akhtar Abbas v. Nayyar Hussain 1982 SCMR 549 ref. (b) Jurisdiction--- ----Principle---It is constitutionally impermissible for the courts to expand and enlarge their jurisdictional domain, which is neither allowed by the Constitution nor by the law. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Judicial review---Scope---High Court cannot grant a relief, which is not even sought in the petition---Gateway to invoke judicial review of the High Court is only when there is an application or appeal by the aggrieved or affected party---In the absence of any such application, the High Court may enter into the domain of judicial overreach, which is the exercise of power without any legal basis and the same falls within the ambit of interference and encroachment on the legislative and executive domain---Consequently, such absolute judicial expansionism offends the principle of separation of powers. Taufiq Asif v. General (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf PLD 2024 SC 610 and Akhtar Abbas v. Nayyar Hussain 1982 SCMR 549 ref. (d) Appeal--- ----Principle---An appeal is the continuation of the same proceedings that allows the appellate court to consider all those aspects which were even challenged before the forum of the first instance. (e) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 10A---Fair trial and due process---Right to be heard---'Audi alteram partem', principle of---Principle of 'audi alteram partem' is one of the foundational principles of natural justice---It necessitates the requirement of being heard so that the judicial order reflects the contention of every party before the court---To fulfill the requirements of being heard, it is settled that the relevant party must be issued first a notice and then be allowed a hearing---These two (notice and hearing) are basic pre-requisites, which satisfy the test of being heard as well as fair trial and due process within the ambit of Article 10A of the Constitution. Provincial Police Officer v. Muhammad Nawaz 2011 SCMR 689 and Karachi Electric Supply Corporation v. Abdul Jabbar Channa 2003 PLC (C.S.) 500 ref. (f) Judicial review--- ----Legislative and executive actions---Constitution does not envision that the courts are bestowed with unfettered powers that can be exercised within the disguise of judicial review---Judicial review of legislative and executive actions is not an unlimited or unbridled authority of the courts but one that is circumscribed or confided by the Constitution and the law. For the Petitioners/Applicants: Uzair Karamat Bhandari, Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Ali Uzair Bhandari, Capt. (R.) Zafar Iqbal, DG, FGEHA, Basit Khan, Director Law, Faiz Umer Sial, Dir (Admn.), FGEHA (in C.Ps. Nos. 767 and 857 to 868 of 2022). Shah Khawar, Advocate Supreme Court, Sh. Mehmood Ahmed, Advocate-on-Record (in C.Ps. Nos. 1272 to 1274 of 2022). Hafiz Ahsan Ahmed Khokhar, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.Ps. Nos. 6616 of 2021 and 4545 of 2022). Mian Abdul Rauf, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.Ps. Nos. 4546 and 4666 of 2022 and applicant in C.M.A. No. 5957 of 2022). Mehmood A. Sheikh, Advocate-on-Record (in C.P. No. 4548 of 2022). Ch. Ali Muhammad, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.P. No. 4549 of 2022). For the Federation: (in all cases) Ch. Aamir Rehman, Additional Attorney General for Pakistan, Malik Javed Akhtar Wains, Addl. Attorney General for Pakistan, Raja Shafqat Abbasi, D.A.G., Dr. Shahzad Bangash, Secy. H&W and Ashfaq Ghumman, Additional Secretary, Ministry of H&W. For Respondents Nos. 1, 3 to 11: (in C. P. No. 767 of 2022, 3, 5 to 13 in C.P. No. 4546 of 2022 and 1, 3 to 11 in C.P.4547 of 2022) Azid Nafees, Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Bader Iqbal Ch. Advocate. In C.M.A. No. 4843 of 2024: Raja Muhammad Farooq, Advocate Supreme Court. Respondent No.1 (in C.P. No. 859 of 2022) Asim Shafi, Advocate Supreme Court. Respondent No.1 (in C.Ps. Nos. 862 and 4665 of 2022) Barrister Umer Aslam Khan, Advocate Supreme Court. Respondent No.1 (in C.P. No. 866 of 2022) Sher Bahadur Khan, Advocate (In-person). Respondent No.1 (in C.P. No. 4545 of 2022). Mian Abdul Rauf, Advocate Supreme Court. Respondent No.1 (in C.P. No. 4546 of 2022) Ch. Riasat Ali Gondal, Advocate Supreme Court. Respondent (FGEHA) (in C.P. No. 4549 of 2022) Niaz Ahmed Rathore, Advocate Supreme Court. Applicant (in C.MA. No. 104 of 2023) Mrs. Ali Begum Jan, in person. Respondent No.1 (in C.Ps. Nos. 1272 and 1274 and C.M.A. No. 4803 of 2022). Rana Abid Nazir, Advocate Supreme Court and Tariq Aziz, Advocate-on-Record. Respondents in person Nasrullah, Khumar Gul, Muhammad Asif and Zafran Ahmad. In C.M.A. No. 1179 of 2023 Asad Iqbal Siddiqui, Advocate High Court. In C.P. No. 859 of 2021 and C.M.A. No. 2239 of 2021. Najeeb-ur-Rehman Abbasi (in person) Date of hearing: 21st May, 2024.

Summary: ----O. VI, Rr. 5, 12 & O. VII, R. 11--- Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched., Art. 113---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 12---Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell---Rejection of plaint--- Pleadings, contents of---Oral agreement---Limitation---Petitioner/ plaintiff was aggrieved of concurrent findings of facts by two Courts below rejecting suit filed by him---Validity---Where pleading as to existence of agreement was pleaded from conversations, it was not necessary for petitioner/ plaintiff to spell out entire contract in detail---It was proper to make general claim as to the contract which petitioner/plaintiff was attempting to enforce---If plaint was ambiguous, the Court could ask for further and better particulars to be filed by petitioner/plaintiff under the provisions of O. VI, R. 5 C.P.C.-- -Just because the terms of agreement were not spelt out, such agreement could not be treated as unenforceable and could not be automatically rejected under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C.---Once agreement to sell was admitted by respondent/defendant and various terms of oral agreement were unilaterally modified by respondent/ defendant, the same amounted to respondent/defendant refusing to perform his obligations on such oral agreement of sale and such admission had given petitioner/plaintiff a right to maintain a lis for specific performance---Date of legal notice was 12-05-2018, time period for institution of lis was to be determined from that date and having been presented on 6-05-2019, suit was within time period specified under Art. 113 of First Sched. of Limitation Act, 1908, and which, subject to evidence to the contrary of any other issue of limitation was maintainable before the Trial Court---There was a material irregularity in judgments passed by two Courts below and both failed to apply the law in respect of application of O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C., properly---High Court revised judgments by two Courts below which were set-aside and application under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C. was dismissed---High Court remanded the matter to Trial Court for decision on merits---Revision was allowed accordingly. Abdul Waheed v. Mst. Ramzanu 2006 SCMR 489; Zahid Jamil v. Mst. Saeeda Bano 2011 MLD 693; Jaiwanti Bai v. Messrs Amir Corporation PLD 2021 SC 434; Managing Director Sui Southern Gas Company Limited Karachi v. Ghulam Abbas PLD 2003 SC 724; Irshad Ali v. Sajjad Ali PLD 1995 SC 629; Shoukat Ullah v. Adil Tiwana 2018 SCMR 769; Maulana Nur-Ul-Haq v. Ibrahim Khalil 2000 SCMR 1305; Ghulam Muhammad and 8 others v. Town Committee Piplan Through Assistant Commissioner/Administrator District Mianwali and 7 others 2003 MLD 1222; Haji Abdul Karim v. Messrs Florida Builders (Private) Limited PLD 2012 SC 247; Mubashir Ahmed v. Syed Muhammad Shah 2011 SCMR 1109; Muhammad Nawaz through LR v. Haji Muhammad Baran Khan 2013 SCMR 1300; Mst Kubra Ahmed v. Yasmeen Tariq PLD 2019 SC 677; Sadruddin v. Sultan Khan 2021 SCMR 642 and Muhammad Ghaffar (Deceased) v. Arif Muhammad 2023 SCMR 344 rel. (b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----S. 12---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched., Art. 113---Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell---Limitation---Computation---Limitation is to commence from either a specified date that has been mentioned in oral agreement of sale for performance, and in the event that no date is specified then limitation is to be calculated from the date when a party refuses to perform his obligations under the oral agreement of sale. Mazhar Ali Dehraj for Petitioner. Muhammad Sohail Hasan for Respondents. Dates of hearing: 26th and 27th April, 2023.

Summary: ----S. 5(5)---Anti-Money Laundering Act (VII of 2010), S. 8---Seizure of assets---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 4, 9, 18, 23, 24 & 25---Constitutional petition---Attachment of property involved in money laundering---Scope---Petitioner was facing inquiry and investigation and Federal Investigation Agency blocked his bank accounts---Validity---Freezing of bank accounts deprives individuals of their hope to lead a meaningful life, as it takes away their most significant asset (cash in bank accounts)---Thus, some Investigating Officers, who made departure from observing formalities while blocking the accounts of citizens for an indefinite period, could not be allowed to violate the fundamental rights of citizens, enshrined in Arts. 4, 9, 18, 23, 24 & 25 of the Constitution---Said provisions of law provided the entire mechanism for attachment of property involved in money laundering, wherein, the Investigating Officer on the basis of a report in his possession received from the concerned investigating agency, by order in writing, with prior permission of the Court, could provisionally attach property, which he reasonably believed to be proceeds of crimes or involved in money laundering for a period not exceeding ninety days from the date of such order---If such permission was granted, then in terms of S. 9 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, the Investigating Officer shall not later than seven days from the date of order of attachment made under subsection (1) of S. 8, served a notice of not less than 30 days on the person concerned---Such notice shall call upon the person to indicate the sources of his income, earning or assets or out of which or by means of which he has acquired the property attached under subsection (1) of S. 8 and the evidence in which he relied and the other relevant information and particulars---Members of Federal Investigation Agency frequently closed third-party accounts involving odd transactions under mere suspicion and that too without affording them an opportunity to explain their position regarding the transactions---Instead of freezing the account to the extent of the amount involved in the alleged transaction, they blocked the account while barring the third party from enjoying the amount not relevant to the alleged transaction---Admittedly, primarily the order of seizure was to be obtained from the appropriate authority and in the latter part of S. 5(5), it was mentioned that such seizure order was subject to confirmation by the Court having jurisdiction to try the offence---Members of Federal Investigation Agency, while inquiring or investigating an offence of money laundering or any other offence within their jurisdiction, must seek permission from the Court to freeze bank accounts under S. 5(5) of the Federal Investigation Agency Act, 1974 and Ss. 8 & 9 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010---Such permission must be sought from the Court within the territorial jurisdiction where the offence occurred specially the Court in whose territory the holder of a bank account under investigation was involved in suspicious activity or directly connected to an offence of money laundering---Federal Investigation Agency was a federal entity and had its tentacles throughout the country, as such calling of suspects to different cities of the country or headquarters, instead of conducting investigations at their place of residence was not suitable---Localized approach instead of the currently adhered centralized one could yield better results and streamline operations---In such state of affairs, the impugned seizure letter dated 10.10.2022 issued by the Assistant Director, State Bank Circle (SBC) FIA suffered from perversity; was clear transgression of authority, and was a nullity in the eye of law---Petitions were allowed, in circumstances. Aimal Khan Kakar, Amicus Curiae for Petitioner (in C.P. No. 1828 of 2022). Shai Haq Baloch, Addl. Advocate General assisted by Hameedullah Babar, Assistant Director (Legal) FIA assisted by Ali Raza, Assistant Director/In-charge CCRC, Quetta, Ayaz Khan, SI, FIA and Shai Mureed, District Manager UBL for Respondents (in C.P. No. 1828 of 2022). Riaz Ahmed Soomro and Aimal Khan Kakar, Amici Curiae for Petitioner (in C.P. No.1845 of 2022). Shai Haq Baloch, Addl. Advocate General assisted by Hameedullah Babar, Assistant Director (Legal) FIA assisted by Ali Raza, Assistant Director/ In-charge CCRC, Quetta, Ayaz Khan, SI, FIA and Shai Mureed, District Manager UBL for Respondents (in C.P. No.1845 of 2022). Date of hearing: 31st July, 2023.

Summary: (a) Master and servant--- ----Termination of service---Verbal order---Effect---Under the labour laws, there is no provision permitting the employer to terminate the services of the worker verbally without a written order---Termination of service by a verbal order is alien to the labour law. (b) Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968)--- ----Sched. Para 1(b), S.Os. 2(g) & 12---Industrial Relations Act (X of 2012 ), S. 33---Reinstatement into service---Permanent workman---Entitlement---Evidence, deficiency of---Company /Establishment filed constitutional petition as the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) re-instated the respondents concluding that the respondents (thirteen in number) had produced sufficient material to show that they were permanent workers who had been working in petitioner /establishment as workers for the last several years---Validity---Record, revealed that the respondents only produced the I.D Card / attendance card issued by the petitioner /company where they were shown to be casual workers---Evidence adduced by respondents also revealed their certain adverse admissions relating to different respondents (as grievance petitioners) like not attaching the copy of the I.D card, not signing the grievance petition, no authority letter, casual workers written on the duty card, not being aware whether grievance notices were sent to the petitioner company or otherwise and not signing power of attorney---Thus, entire burden ought not to have been shifted upon the petitioner / company alone by the NIRC, whereas the respondents were set free as they failed to prove through cogent material that they rendered their services for the petitioner / company for more than nine months as required under the law---In the absence of such material, the petitioner / company could not be directed to reinstate their services which were of a temporary nature---National Industrial Relations Commission had erroneously granted the benefit of reinstatement of service to the respondents by holding that the respondents fall within the definition of permanent 'workmen', which findings were based on guesswork, conjectures and suffered from misreading of evidence and record, resulting in gross miscarriage of justice---High Court set-aide impugned orders passed by NIRC---Constitutional petition, filed by Company / Establishment, was allowed, in circumstance. 2018 SCMR 1181 distinguished. (c) Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968)--- ----Sched. Para 1(b), S.Os. 2(g) & 12---Industrial Relations Act (X of 2012), S. 33---Reinstatement into service---Permanent workman---Entitlement---Temporary / casual workman---Scope---Company / Establishment filed constitutional petition as the National Industrial Relations Commission re-instated the respondents---Held, that definition 2(g) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Order) Ordinance, 1968, ('the Ordinance, 1968') provides the classification of the workman, which is sub-divided into six categories i.e. (i) permanent, (ii) probationers, (iii) badlis, (iv) temporary, (v) apprentice and (vi) contract workers---A temporary workman is defined in the Schedule to the Ordinance, 1968 as a workman who has been engaged for work of a temporary nature, which is likely to be finished within a period not exceeding nine months---The protection of the, daily wagers who have been performing their duties against permanent posts for a long period is Para 1(b) of the Schedule attached to the Ordinance, 1968---Standing Order 12 of the Ordinance 1968 provides that no temporary workmen (whether monthly rated, weekly rated daily rated or piece rated and no probational or badali shall be entitled to any notice if his services are terminated by the employer, nor shall any such workman be required to give any notice or pay wages in lieu thereof to the employer if he leaves the employment of his own accord---However, the situation is quite different than the permanent workman under Standing Order 12(3) of the Ordinance, 1968---Thus, NIRC had erroneously granted the benefit of reinstatement of service to the respondents by holding that the respondents fell within the definition of permanent 'workmen', which findings were based on guesswork, conjectures and suffered from misreading of evidence and record, resulting in gross miscarriage of justice---High Court set-aide impugned orders passed by NIRC---Constitutional petition, filed by Company / Establishment, was allowed, in circumstance. Muhammad Ali and Ovais Ali Shah for Petitioner. Bacha Fazal Manan for Respondent. Kashif Nazir Assistant Attorney General for Respondents Nos.14 and 15. Date of hearing: 25th March, 2024.

Summary: Industrial Relations Act (X of 2012)--- ----Ss. 2(x)(xxxiii) & 87---Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968), S. 2(i)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Industrial dispute---Trans-provincial establishment---Petitioner / establishment assailed orders passed by the forums below declaring that provisions of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 were applicable---Validity---Petitioner / establishment qualified as an 'establishment' in terms of S. 2(x) of Industrial Relations Act, 2012, which included a company that had employed a workman for carrying on business, which nature of business was distinguishable from the industry---Respondent / employee was dismissed whose individual grievance came within the ambit of an industrial dispute in terms of S.2(xvi) of Industrial Relations Act, 2012---This was a dispute between an employer and workman and was connected with employment or otherwise concerning the terms and conditions of employment---Respondent / employee also came within the definition of workman under S.2 (xxxiii) of Industrial Relations Act, 2012, as he was not employed to conduct managerial or administrative assignment---Even if petitioner / establishment was not qualified as a 'commercial establishment' for the purpose of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, but it came within the ambit of an establishment under Industrial Relations Act, 2012 which might not be a ground for dismissing claim of respondent / employee in the wake of S. 87 of Industrial Relations Act, 2012, which had extended an overriding effect to the Act, 2012---Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in concurrent findings of two for a below---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances. Syed Shahid Abbas and 36 others v. Chenab Club (Guarantee) Limited Faisalabad through President and another 2008 PLC 58; Messrs Pak Telecom Mobile Limited v. Muhammad Atif Bilal and 2 others 2024 PLC 130 and Fauji Foundation (Headquarters) through Manager Administration v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and 2 others 2007 SCMR 1346 rel. Muhammad Ali Siddiqui, Fatima Safeer and Sammar Abbas for Petitioners. Malik Masroor Haider Usman, Assistant Advocate General. Rana Ghulam Hussain, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan. Sajjad Hussain Tangra for Respondent No.3.