Summary: ----O.XXXIX, Rr. 1, 2 & S.151--- Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 12, 39, 42 & 55---Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss. 2(h) & 10---Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S.54---Suit for declaration, direction, cancellation, mandatory/prohibitory injunction and damages---Rejection of offer of highest bidder creating a third party interest in the garb of benefit to public exchequer---Legality---Invitation to treat and binding offer---Difference---Creation of contractual right---Scope---Public auction for sale of plots---Authority reserving right to accept or reject the bid/offer without assigning any reason---Scope---Plaintiff being highest bidder deposited earnest money agreeing to twicely increased bid money and was issued letter of acceptance by the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC)---PIDC while rejecting the twicely increased offer of the plaintiff returned his earnest money for creating a third party interest----Plaintiff sought injunction restraining the PIDC from creating third party interest on the ground that the transaction of sale had been completed, which could not be changed by PIDC unilaterally by inclusion of a new competitor, who did not participate in the bidding proceedings---Validity--- Advertisement of inviting bids for the sale of suit plots/land was an announcement made by PIDC being owner of the suit plots to the public, indicating that it was seeking offers from potential buyers to purchase the suit plots---Such an advertisement was usually an invitation to treat rather than a binding offer, which outlined the process by which interested parties could submit their bids and provide relevant details about the land and the bidding procedure---Subsequent communication of PIDC offering the sale of the suit plots to both the plaintiff and the defendant at a reserved price within a specified time frame, which was accepted by the plaintiff, who communicated its acceptance to PIDC, significantly altered the situation and the complexion of the case, thus, it could not be conclusively determined that letter was merely an invitation to treat---Disposal of government-owned assets needed to maximize public benefit and PIDC was obligated by law to make policy decision rooted in these commercial considerations---Such reservation of authority to accept or reject any or all offers without assigning any reason, did not endow the public functionary with a brazen, unchecked and arbitrary power to reject an offer solely because they possessed or reserved such authority---Such reason would effectively grant government-controlled entities the authority to cancel bids at their own will, leading to potential abuse of power, which could allow arbitrary bid rejections without transparency or accountability, undermining the principles of fairness and openness essential to a competitive bidding process---If bidders believed their offers could be disregarded on a whim, they might be discouraged from participating, leading to an erosion of trust in the system, making it harder to attract serious and reputable entitles/bidders in future transactions---An authority might reserve the right to accept or reject any bid or offer, provided this discretion was exercised with caution, due diligence, and utmost responsibility---Plaintiff sought enforcement of letter, thus, High Court while treating the suit for declaration as suit for specific performance of contract created between the parties directed the plaintiff to deposit the entire sum of bid money in cash with the Nazir of the court along with the accrued mark-up at the tentative rate of 18% per annum on the remaining sale consideration---Plaintiff had made out prima facie arguable case, balance of convenience also laid in his favour and he would suffer irreparable loss in case the corpus of this lis (an immovable property) was not preserved, thus, the application was allowed subject to the condition that if plaintiff failed to deposit the specified amount with the Nazir within the allotted time, the interlocutory application shall stand dismissed. Chairman Regional Transport v. Pakistan Mutual Insurance PLD 1991 SC 14; Commissioner Income Tax v. Siemen AG PLD 1991 SC 368; Lahore Development Authority v. Muhammad Tariq Niaz 2020 SCMR 1957 and Ahmar Iqbal v. Ministry of Energy 2020 MLD 1849 ref. Cemtech-Jiangsu JV v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 2023 CLC 363; Asif Shah v. Mazhar Javed 2022 CLC 1985; Muhammad Jawed v. First Women Bank Ltd. 2020 SCMR 2134; Muhammad Jawed v. First Women Bank Limited 2020 CLD 254; Bio-Labs v. Province of Punjab PLD 2020 Lah. 565; Sinotec Co. v. Province of Sindh PLD 2018 Kar. 303; Pakistan Gas Port v. Sui Southern Gas PLD 2016 Sindh 207; Muhammad Hayat v. Director General 2016 MLD 1287; Nisar v. Muhammad Saeed Safdar 2010 CLC 794; Petrosin Corporation v. Oil and Gas Development Company 2010 SCMR 306; Tariq Mehmood Memon v. Province of Sindh 2007 CLD 1336; Noor Muhammad v. Chief Engineer 2007 SCMR 1572; Mumtaz Ahmad Chadhar v. Nasir Ali 2005 SCMR 263; Abdul Hamid Khan v. Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner 1975 SCMR 406 and Parvez Qureshi v. Settlement Commissioner, Multan 1974 SCMR 337 distinguished. Fateh Muhammad Agha v. City District Government 2009 CLD 1336; Reliance Consultancy v. Federation of Pakistan 2010 CLC 1046; Lahore Development Authority v. Muhammad Tariq Niaz 2020 SCMR 1957; Safia Bibi v. Aisha Bibi 1982 SCMR 494; Pakistan Fisheries Ltd v. United Bank Ltd. PLD 1993 SC 109; Jane Margrete William v. Abdul Hamid Mian 1994 SCMR 1555; Asif Kudia v. KASB Bank Limited 2014 CLD 1548 = 2015 CLC 1734; Al-Khair Gadoon Ltd. v. The Appellate Tribunal 2019 SCMR 2018; DW Pakistan v. Anisa Fazl-i-Mahmood 2023 SCMR 555; Muhammad Asif Awan v. Dawood Khan 2021 SCMR 1270; Kuwait National Real Estate v. Educational Excellence Ltd. 2020 SCMR 171 and Muhammad Abdur Rehman Qureshi v. Sagheer Ahmad 2017 SCMR 1696 rel. Khawaja Shamsul Islam and Imtiaz Ali Shah for Plaintiff. Asim Iqbal, Farmanullah, Ms. Syeda Khizra Fatima Chishti and Syeda Maryam Mastoor for Defendant No.1. Imran Ahmed Abro, A.A.G. for Defendant No.2. Dates of hearing: 14th, 28th November, 2023, 8th March and 10th August, 2024.

Summary: ----Ss. 9 & 10---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ,O. VII, R. 10 & O. XIII R. 1---Suit for recovery, filing of---Territorial jurisdiction, determination of---Scope---Documents admitted/acknowledged by parties---Effect---Suit filed at Rawalpindi ('R')---Held, that in the present case, the admitted documents/agreements (Diminishing Musharakah Financing Agreement etc.) clearly depicted that the parties had mutually agreed to resolve their issues at Courts of Karachi ('K') having exclusive jurisdiction for the determination of their disputes---Based on the agreements between the parties, which had been acknowledged by the parties and the documents filed and relied by the plaintiffs under S. 9 of Financial Institution (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 ('the Ordinance 2001') along with list of documents under O. XIII, R. 1 of the "C.P.C." and under S. 10 of the Ordinance 2001 by the defendant, High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the matter due to specific and exclusive jurisdiction clauses in all the agreements---High Court lacked territorial jurisdiction to pass any judgment and decree against the defendant; therefore, the plaint was returned under O. VII, R. 10 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, for presenting it before a Court of competent jurisdiction---Suit was disposed of accordingly. Faysal Bank Limited v. Messrs Usman Enterprises and another 2023 CLD 1563; Eden Builders (Pvt.) Limited, Lahore v. Muhammad Aslam and others 2022 SCMR 2044; State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan v. Rana Muhammad Saleem 1987 SCMR 393 and Messrs Kadir Motors (Regd). Rawalpindi v. Messrs National Motors Ltd., Karachi and 3 others 1992 SCMR 1174 ref. (b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----S. 9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R. 10---Suit for recovery, filing of---Territorial jurisdiction, determination of---Scope---Exclusive jurisdiction incorporated in agreement regarding a place other than where the suit was filed---Effect---Suit was filed at Rawalpindi ('R')---Held, that in the present case, documents/ agreements (Diminishing Musharakah Financing Agreement etc.) clearly depicted that the parties had mutually agreed to include/incorporate jurisdiction clauses in a clear and unambiguously manner, which showed that the parties had given exclusive jurisdiction to the Courts at Karachi ('K')---Thus, the parties were bound by their terms and conditions for resolution of their disputes---All the agreements were executed on different dates at the registered office of the defendant at Karachi and were not disputed by the parties---Lahore High Court lacked territorial jurisdiction to pass any judgment and decree against the defendant; the plaint was returned under O. VII, R. 10 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, for presenting it before a Court of competent jurisdiction---Suit was disposed of accordingly. Eden Builders (Pvt.) Limited, Lahore v. Muhammad Aslam and others 2022 SCMR 2044; State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan v. Rana Muhammad Saleem 1987 SCMR 393; Messrs Kadir Motors (Regd). Rawalpindi v. Messrs National Motors Ltd., Karachi and 3 others 1992 SCMR 1174; Saleem Mehtab v. Messrs Refhan Best Food Ltd, Compnay through Chief Executive and 9 others 2010 MLD 1015; Chaudhry Mehtab Ahmad and another v. Mir. Shakeel-ur-Rehman and 4 others 2004 MLD 662; Tahir Tariq Textile Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive and 2 others v. N.D.F. C. through Chairman 2001 YLR 846; Tradesmen International (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock and another 2008 CLD 1217; Bankers Equity Ltd. v. Iqas Weaving Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. 2001 CLD 169 and MCB Bank Limited v. Adeel Shahbaz Steel Mills and others 2023 CLD 655 ref. (c) Jurisdiction--- ----Principle---When parties were at controversy regarding point of jurisdiction of Court, it was incumbent upon the Court either to decide question of jurisdiction after giving an opportunity of hearing to parties and then to proceed with the other issues regarding merits of case. American Express Travel Related Services Company Inc. and others v. Muhammad Nasrullah Beg, Advocate 2000 MLD 1155 ref. (d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----S. 9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R. 10---Suit for recovery, filing of---Territorial jurisdiction, determination of---Scope---'Boilerplate clauses'---Scope---All commercial and banking contracts/ agreements contain a number of "boilerplate clauses", which are often seen as standard add-ons to the main terms and conditions of the contract---One such "boilerplate clause" relates to jurisdiction and choice of law, and although these can be relatively straightforward when both parties are based in the same jurisdiction, they deserve proper consideration, particularly when the parties to the contract are based in different jurisdictions---In drafting dispute resolution clauses in commercial contracts and banking agreements, parties contemplate, inter alia, the most convenient and affordable forums to resolve their disputes through the "boilerplate clauses"---In the present case, all the agreements were executed on different dates at the registered office of the defendant at Karachi and this was not disputed by the parties---Lahore High Court lacked territorial jurisdiction to pass any judgment and decree against the defendant; the plaint was returned under O. VII, R.10 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 for presenting it before a Court of Competent Jurisdiction---Suit was disposed of accordingly. State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan v. Rana Muhammad Saleem 1987 SCMR 393 and Messrs Kadir Motors (Regd). Rawalpindi v. Messrs National Motors Ltd., Karachi and 3 others 1992 SCMR 1174 ref. (e) Contract--- ----'Boilerplate clause'---Scope---A boilerplate clause is a legal English term that is used in conjunction with contract law---When forming contracts, parties to the contract often use templates or forms with boilerplate clauses (boilerplate language, used as standard language)---Such clauses refers to the standardized clauses in contracts, and they are to be found towards the end of the agreement---Including boilerplate clauses is the process by which parties to the contract may better define their relationship and the will to provide certainty if terms in the contract are ever disputed---Boilerplate clauses are standard contractual terms that are routinely included in many contracts---In the present case, all the agreements were executed on different dates at the registered office of the defendant at Karachi and this was not disputed by the parties---Lahore High Court lacks territorial jurisdiction to pass any judgment and decree against the defendant; the plaint was returned under O. VII, R. 10 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, for presenting it before a Court of competent jurisdiction---Suit was disposed of accordingly. (f) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----S. 9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R. 10---Suit for recovery, filing of---Territorial jurisdiction, determination of---Scope---Exclusive jurisdiction clause---'Boilerplate clause'---Scope---Boilerplate clauses---Validity---Question that parties to a contract are faced with is the extent of autonomy they can exercise in choosing an appropriate forum in a "boilerplate clauses"---Henceforth, to avoid the hassle of litigating in a forum, which is inconvenient or time-consuming, parties often mutually agree to litigate their disputes before a specific Court---Such clauses are drafted taking into account the common economic and geographic convenience of the parties---Exclusive jurisdiction clauses enunciate a choice by parties to limit the place of institution of the suit to one forum---Jurisdiction clauses, therefore, relate as to which Courts would hear a dispute---Nevertheless, an exclusive jurisdiction specifies that only the Courts of a particular jurisdiction, such as those of 'K' (Karachi), in the present case, should deal with any disputes arising out of a contract between the parties---In the present case, all the agreements were executed on different dates at the registered office of the defendant at Karachi and this was not disputed by the parties---Lahore High Court lacked territorial jurisdiction to pass any judgment and decree against the defendant; the plaint was returned under O. VII, R. 10 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 for presenting it before a Court of Competent Jurisdiction---Suit was disposed of accordingly. Muhammad Imran Malik, Advocate Supreme Court, Aakif Majeed and Asim Tufail Farooqi for Plaintiffs. Ms. Samia Faiz Durrani, Advocate Supreme Court, Faiz Durani, Advocate Supreme Court with Salman Khan Baryalay and Arshad Mehmood for Defendants. Dates of hearing: 23rd April and 30th September, 2024.

Summary: ----S. 24(1)(c)---Elections Act (XXXIII 2017), S. 39---Local Bodies Election---Seat of Councillor---Eligibility to contest the election---Determination---Disqualification of returned candidate on account of not being enrolled as voter in the electoral roll of the relevant Ward---Application of concept of "Throw Away Votes"---Scope---Election petition filed by the respondent was accepted declaring the appellant as disqualified to contest the election and his notification as returned candidate was set-aside while declaring the respondent as returned candidate---Contention of the appellant was that the Election Tribunal while deciding the matter had ignored the relevant record qua transfer of his vote and respondent could not be declared returned candidate as concept of "Throw Away Vote" was not applicable in such matter---Validity---Voters list was published after announcement of election schedule, thus, under S. 39 of the Elections Act, 2017, no revision, correction or transfer could have been made in the Electoral List--Appellant was voter of Ward-A but in violation of S. 24(1)(c) of the Balochistan Local Government Act, 2010, the appellant contested the election from Ward-B and as such the appellant was rightly disqualified by the Election Tribunal, thus, to the extent of disqualification of appellant, no interference was required by High Court---If the disqualification of a returned candidate was not notorious at the time of polling, the votes polled in favour of the successful candidate could not be thrown away by giving seat to the candidate with next highest number of votes---Nomination papers of the appellant were accepted by the Returning Officer without any objection, which proved that the voters were unaware of the disqualification of the appellant, thus, the rule of "Throw Away Votes" could not be invoked by the Election Tribunal---Declaration of respondent as returned candidate was set aside and the election was declared void as a whole with a direction to Election Commission of Pakistan to hold fresh election in accordance with law---Election appeal was partially allowed, in circumstances. Sh. Amjad Aziz v. Haroon Akhtar Khan 2004 SCMR 1484 rel. Manzoor Ahmed Shah for Appellant. Jameel Ahmed Khan Babai for Respondent No. 1. Shahzad Aslam, Assistant Director (Law), Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) assisted by Naseer Ahmed, Senior Personal Assistant ECP for Respondents Nos. 2 to 6 and 9. Nemo for Respondents Nos. 7 and 8. Date of hearing: 11th October, 2024.

Summary: ----Ss. 172(2)(ii),172 (2)(v), 172 (2) (vi) & 172(2)(xvi)---Gift-mutation, challenging of---Fraud alleged by the donor---Jurisdiction---Whether revenue authorities/courts or civil court had jurisdiction---Settlement Officer set-aside gift-mutation accepting application of the donor filed by him in his life ('the gift mutation-in-question') which findings were maintained upto the Board of Revenue---Donees (petitioners) challenged said orders---Held: The donor challenged the gift mutation-in-question by seeking its (mutation's) cancellation on the ground of fraud, which was contested by the two petitioners (who were sons of the donor from first wife) thus, resulting in controversial question of facts---Such disputes require adjudication through the presentation of evidence by both parties in support of their respective claims---Importantly, S. 172 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967 ('the Act 1967') assigns certain matters to the jurisdiction of the revenue authority, thereby excluding the jurisdiction of civil court---Revenue authority has a limited scope of inquiry and does not function like a civil court concerning contested matters that necessitate the framing of issues and determination through evidence---Such matters fall solely within the jurisdiction of civil courts---Furthermore, S. 172(2)(xvi) of the Act 1967 leaves the adjudication of plea of fraud to the competence of civil court---In the present case, the revenue authorities (from settlement authority to the Senior Member Board of Revenue) vide impugned orders had decided controversial question of "fraud" in summary proceedings, which was excluded under clause (v) and clause(xvi) of S. 172(2) of the Act 1967 to the extent of first mutation of gift for which they had no jurisdiction---The revenue authority, under clauses (ii), (vi) and (xvi) of S. 172(2) of the Act 1967 was authorized to exercise its powers, which included compelling the discharge of any duties imposed by the Act 1967, or any other enactment for the time being in force, correcting entries in the record of rights, or addressing any claims to set aside on grounds other than "fraud"---High Court set-aside the impugned orders passed by revenue authorities while aggrieved legal heirs of donor (now deceased) were at liberty to seek their remedy before the plenary jurisdiction of the civil court---Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly. Abdul Majeed Khan through L.Rs and others v. Ms. Naheem Begum and others 2014 SCMR 1524 ref. (b) Balochistan Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)--- ----Ss. 172 (2)(ii),, 172 (2) (vi) & 172(2)(xvi)---Gift-mutation---Challenging gift-mutation on ground other than fraud---Jurisdiction---Whether revenue authorities/courts or civil court had jurisdiction---Settlement Officer set-aside gift-mutation accepting application of the donor (father who contracted two marriages) filed by him in his life ('the gift mutation-in-question') which findings were maintained upto the Board of Revenue---Donees/sons (petitioners) challenged said orders---Held: In the present matter, the contents of gift-in-question remained un-disputed---The revenue authority, under clauses (ii), (vi) and (xvi) of S. 172(2) of the Act 1967 was authorized to exercise its powers, which included compelling the discharge of any duties imposed by the Act 1967, or any other enactment for the time being in force, correcting entries in the record of rights, or addressing any claims to set aside, on grounds other than "fraud"---No illegality had been noticed in the impugned gift-mutation cancelling orders passed by revenue authorities---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. (c) Islamic law--- ----Gift---Ingredients---Delivery of possession, absence of---Revocation of gift---Gift-mutation, challenging of---Settlement Officer set-aside gift-mutation accepting application of the donor filed by him in his life ('the gift mutation-in-question') which findings were maintained upto the Board of Revenue---Validity---To constitute a valid gift under Para 149 of Principles of Muhammadan Law, delivery of possession of the subject of the gift by the donor to the donee is one of three essential ingredients (i.e. declaration, acceptance and delivery of possession of gift)---Under Para 167 of Principles of Muhammadan Law, the donor can opt revocation of gift before delivery of possession or where gift property has not been delivered to the donee---In the present case, the recital in the mutation of the gift mutation-in-question did not state that the purported subject matter of the gift was handed over to the donees---Therefore, it could not be concluded that the gift of the property-in-question was delivered to the donees---No illegality had been noticed in the impugned gift-mutation cancelling orders passed by revenue authorities---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Azeem Khan and another v. Mujahid Khan and others 2016 SCMR 1417; Mst. Kalsoom Begum v. Peran Ditta and others 2022 SCMR 1352 and Dildar Ahmad and others v. Member (Judicial-III) BOR, Punjab, Lahore 2019 SCMR 906 ref. (d) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--- ----Arts. 102 & 103---Gift-mutation, challenging of---Delivery of possession, absence of---Revocation of gift---Scope---Documentary evidence, presence of---Oral assertion---Scope and effect---Settlement Officer set-aside gift-mutation accepting application of the donor filed by him in his life ('the gift mutation-in-question') which findings were maintained upto the Board of Revenue---Contention of the petitioners/ donees was that the question whether the gift/land was handed over to the donees required determination through oral evidence---Validity---In the present case, the recital in the mutation of the gift mutation-in-question did not state that the purported subject matter of the gift was handed over to the donees---Article 102 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 ('the Order 1984') provides that when the terms of a contract, grant or any deposition of property, have been reduced to the form of a document, no evidence shall be admissible to prove the terms of such contract, grant or other deposition of property or of such matter except the document itself, or secondary evidence of its contents in cases in which secondary evidence is admissible under the relevant provision---Article 102 of the Order, 1984 provides that no oral evidence could be led to contradict the contents of the written document as the same is deemed inadmissible in the law---In essence, the oral evidence cannot outweigh documentary evidence---The documentary evidence that is not objected at the relevant time, would prevail against oral evidence, regardless of how abundant the latter may be---Mere oral assertions are insufficient to rebut documentary evidence, which holds greater weight and credibility---Article 103 of the Order 1984 excludes oral statements made between the parties to any instrument or their representative---The rationale behind this provision is that a written agreement reflects a deliberate and well considered settlement---Furthermore, a party acknowledging a fact in writing is protected from the potential issue of mischief, failure and memory lapses---Once an agreement has been reduced to writing, oral evidence is excluded when proving the terms, as against the terms specifically articulated in writing---In the present case, the gift mutation relied upon by petitioners indicated "non delivery" of the subject gift/land to the donees---The probability of the petitioners to establish their case before the Civil Court by producing oral evidence, in presence of the documentary evidence, would not enhance their case, therefore, impugned orders concerning petitioners were sustained---No illegality had been noticed in the impugned gift-mutation cancelling orders passed by revenue authorities---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Abdul Ghani and others' case 2011 SCMR 837; Shamshad v. Arif Ashraf Khan and others 2010 SCMR 473; Mst. Baswar Sultan v. Adeeba Alvi 2002 SCMR 326; Bolan Beverages (Pvt.) Limited v. PEPSICO INC and 4 others PLD 2004 SC 860 and Abdul Majeed Khan through L.Rs. and others v. Ms. Maheen Begum and others 2014 SCMR 1217 ref. Muhammad Naeem Marri for Petitioners. Shirjeel Haider for Respondents Nos. 1, 1-a and 1-b. Alla-ud-Din Kakar, A.A.G. for Official Respondents. Date of hearing: 4th December, 2024.

Summary: ----Ss. 172(2)(ii),172 (2)(v), 172 (2) (vi) & 172(2)(xvi)---Gift-mutation, challenging of---Fraud alleged by the donor---Jurisdiction---Whether revenue authorities/courts or civil court had jurisdiction---Settlement Officer set-aside gift-mutation accepting application of the donor filed by him in his life ('the gift mutation-in-question') which findings were maintained upto the Board of Revenue---Donees (petitioners) challenged said orders---Held: The donor challenged the gift mutation-in-question by seeking its (mutation's) cancellation on the ground of fraud, which was contested by the two petitioners (who were sons of the donor from first wife) thus, resulting in controversial question of facts---Such disputes require adjudication through the presentation of evidence by both parties in support of their respective claims---Importantly, S. 172 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967 ('the Act 1967') assigns certain matters to the jurisdiction of the revenue authority, thereby excluding the jurisdiction of civil court---Revenue authority has a limited scope of inquiry and does not function like a civil court concerning contested matters that necessitate the framing of issues and determination through evidence---Such matters fall solely within the jurisdiction of civil courts---Furthermore, S. 172(2)(xvi) of the Act 1967 leaves the adjudication of plea of fraud to the competence of civil court---In the present case, the revenue authorities (from settlement authority to the Senior Member Board of Revenue) vide impugned orders had decided controversial question of "fraud" in summary proceedings, which was excluded under clause (v) and clause(xvi) of S. 172(2) of the Act 1967 to the extent of first mutation of gift for which they had no jurisdiction---The revenue authority, under clauses (ii), (vi) and (xvi) of S. 172(2) of the Act 1967 was authorized to exercise its powers, which included compelling the discharge of any duties imposed by the Act 1967, or any other enactment for the time being in force, correcting entries in the record of rights, or addressing any claims to set aside on grounds other than "fraud"---High Court set-aside the impugned orders passed by revenue authorities while aggrieved legal heirs of donor (now deceased) were at liberty to seek their remedy before the plenary jurisdiction of the civil court---Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly. Abdul Majeed Khan through L.Rs and others v. Ms. Naheem Begum and others 2014 SCMR 1524 ref. (b) Balochistan Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)--- ----Ss. 172 (2)(ii),, 172 (2) (vi) & 172(2)(xvi)---Gift-mutation---Challenging gift-mutation on ground other than fraud---Jurisdiction---Whether revenue authorities/courts or civil court had jurisdiction---Settlement Officer set-aside gift-mutation accepting application of the donor (father who contracted two marriages) filed by him in his life ('the gift mutation-in-question') which findings were maintained upto the Board of Revenue---Donees/sons (petitioners) challenged said orders---Held: In the present matter, the contents of gift-in-question remained un-disputed---The revenue authority, under clauses (ii), (vi) and (xvi) of S. 172(2) of the Act 1967 was authorized to exercise its powers, which included compelling the discharge of any duties imposed by the Act 1967, or any other enactment for the time being in force, correcting entries in the record of rights, or addressing any claims to set aside, on grounds other than "fraud"---No illegality had been noticed in the impugned gift-mutation cancelling orders passed by revenue authorities---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. (c) Islamic law--- ----Gift---Ingredients---Delivery of possession, absence of---Revocation of gift---Gift-mutation, challenging of---Settlement Officer set-aside gift-mutation accepting application of the donor filed by him in his life ('the gift mutation-in-question') which findings were maintained upto the Board of Revenue---Validity---To constitute a valid gift under Para 149 of Principles of Muhammadan Law, delivery of possession of the subject of the gift by the donor to the donee is one of three essential ingredients (i.e. declaration, acceptance and delivery of possession of gift)---Under Para 167 of Principles of Muhammadan Law, the donor can opt revocation of gift before delivery of possession or where gift property has not been delivered to the donee---In the present case, the recital in the mutation of the gift mutation-in-question did not state that the purported subject matter of the gift was handed over to the donees---Therefore, it could not be concluded that the gift of the property-in-question was delivered to the donees---No illegality had been noticed in the impugned gift-mutation cancelling orders passed by revenue authorities---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Azeem Khan and another v. Mujahid Khan and others 2016 SCMR 1417; Mst. Kalsoom Begum v. Peran Ditta and others 2022 SCMR 1352 and Dildar Ahmad and others v. Member (Judicial-III) BOR, Punjab, Lahore 2019 SCMR 906 ref. (d) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--- ----Arts. 102 & 103---Gift-mutation, challenging of---Delivery of possession, absence of---Revocation of gift---Scope---Documentary evidence, presence of---Oral assertion---Scope and effect---Settlement Officer set-aside gift-mutation accepting application of the donor filed by him in his life ('the gift mutation-in-question') which findings were maintained upto the Board of Revenue---Contention of the petitioners/ donees was that the question whether the gift/land was handed over to the donees required determination through oral evidence---Validity---In the present case, the recital in the mutation of the gift mutation-in-question did not state that the purported subject matter of the gift was handed over to the donees---Article 102 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 ('the Order 1984') provides that when the terms of a contract, grant or any deposition of property, have been reduced to the form of a document, no evidence shall be admissible to prove the terms of such contract, grant or other deposition of property or of such matter except the document itself, or secondary evidence of its contents in cases in which secondary evidence is admissible under the relevant provision---Article 102 of the Order, 1984 provides that no oral evidence could be led to contradict the contents of the written document as the same is deemed inadmissible in the law---In essence, the oral evidence cannot outweigh documentary evidence---The documentary evidence that is not objected at the relevant time, would prevail against oral evidence, regardless of how abundant the latter may be---Mere oral assertions are insufficient to rebut documentary evidence, which holds greater weight and credibility---Article 103 of the Order 1984 excludes oral statements made between the parties to any instrument or their representative---The rationale behind this provision is that a written agreement reflects a deliberate and well considered settlement---Furthermore, a party acknowledging a fact in writing is protected from the potential issue of mischief, failure and memory lapses---Once an agreement has been reduced to writing, oral evidence is excluded when proving the terms, as against the terms specifically articulated in writing---In the present case, the gift mutation relied upon by petitioners indicated "non delivery" of the subject gift/land to the donees---The probability of the petitioners to establish their case before the Civil Court by producing oral evidence, in presence of the documentary evidence, would not enhance their case, therefore, impugned orders concerning petitioners were sustained---No illegality had been noticed in the impugned gift-mutation cancelling orders passed by revenue authorities---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Abdul Ghani and others' case 2011 SCMR 837; Shamshad v. Arif Ashraf Khan and others 2010 SCMR 473; Mst. Baswar Sultan v. Adeeba Alvi 2002 SCMR 326; Bolan Beverages (Pvt.) Limited v. PEPSICO INC and 4 others PLD 2004 SC 860 and Abdul Majeed Khan through L.Rs. and others v. Ms. Maheen Begum and others 2014 SCMR 1217 ref. Muhammad Naeem Marri for Petitioners. Shirjeel Haider for Respondents Nos. 1, 1-a and 1-b. Alla-ud-Din Kakar, A.A.G. for Official Respondents. Date of hearing: 4th December, 2024.

Summary: ----Art. 199--- Constitutional petition--- Maintainability--- Alternate efficacious remedy---Grievance of a securities broking company against Pakistan Stock Exchange---Arbitration proceedings---Petitioner assailed initiation of arbitral proceedings before arbitral tribunal by respondent/ Pakistan Stock Exchange---Validity---When alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to a litigant, he should pursue that remedy-- -In presence of arbitration agreement between parties there was no other option left but for the aggrieved party to proceed with agreed alternative dispute resolution mechanism i.e. arbitration---There was no reason to invoke Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court for issuance of writ in an ongoing arbitration matter unless some exceptional ground could be made out for such intervention in the facts and circumstances of the case or in law---Respondent/Pakistan Stock Exchange was not a person performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation---Institutional arbitration was currently under process between parties---Petitioner could not renege from the same and even otherwise, arbitral forum had provided adequate remedy to petitioner, which had not been exhausted---High Court declined to interfere in the matter as an arbitration was underway---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Attock Cement Pakistan Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others C. P. No. D-1590 of 2023; Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1997 SC 84, 192; Pakistan Stock Exchange Limited through Duly Authorized Officer v. Province of Sindh through Secretary, Ministry of Finance and 3 others 2024 CLD 580; Pakistan Stock Brokers Association v. Pakistan Stock Exchange Limited and another C.P. No.D-4449 of 2021 and Competition Commission of Pakistan's case 2023 CLD 475 ref. Haider Waheed for Petitioner. Nemo for Respondent No. 1. Nemo for Respondent No. 2. Nemo for Respondent No.3. Nemo for Respondent No.4 Nemo for Respondent No.5. Nemo for Respondent No.6. Nemo for Respondent No.7. Date of hearing: 13th November, 2024.

Summary: ----Art.128---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.42---Suit for declaration---Parentage, determination of---Permission of Deoxyribonucleic Acid Test ('DNA test') by a court in its revisional jurisdiction---Scope---Paternity claim of respondent (son) denied by appellant (father)---Contention of the appellant was that he had divorced mother of respondent two years prior to birth of respondent, therefore, respondent could not be his son and in order to resolve the controversy courts below should have ordered for DNA test---Validity---Appellant did not deny respondent's paternity and he claimed that "he did not know", therefore, the court correctly drew an adverse presumption from his response---Respondent was born prior to divorce of appellant and his mother---Appellant had declined to acknowledge respondent as his child after more than 18 years---Paternity of a child born in lawful wedlock carries the presumption of truth, and it cannot be refuted by simple denial---Law inclines towards the presumption of paternity rather than illegitimacy---Child born during wedlock has the parentage of the husband---There is no need for an express acknowledgement or an affirmation---Legitimacy of a child cannot be questioned merely because of the father's claim without any evidence to substantiate the same---Appellant produced no evidence to controvert the evidence produced and relied upon by the respondent in support of his contention that he was the son of appellant---There was nothing available on record to suggest that appellant had moved either the trial or appellate courts to conduct DNA test---Resort to DNA testing may be made depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case where the evidence produced by both parties is evenly balanced that no conclusion can be drawn or where the party upon whom the onus lies has not produced any evidence---In the present case respondent had relied on documentary evidence, such as the school and educational records disclosing appellant as his father, whereas appellant could not question the paternity of respondent by asking for a DNA test, notwithstanding appellant put up such plea after more than 18 years of birth of respondent and that too before the court exercising revisional jurisdiction---Revision petition was dismissed accordingly. Cantonment Board Clifton v. Nadim Ahmed Ansari High Court Appeal No.145 of 2018; Loung v. Allah Ditto 2002 CLC 1307; Muhammad Arshat v. Sughran Bibi PLD 2008 Lah 302; Muhammad Nazir v. Ali Muhammad 2003 SCMR 1183; Abdul Rashid v. Safia Bibi PLD 1986 FSC 10 and Sharafat Ali Ashraf v. Additional District Judge, Bahawalpur 2008 SCMR 1707 rel. (b) Islamic law--- ----Marriage---Absence of proof of divorce---Presumption---There is a presumption of marriage based on continued and prolonged cohabitation unless the same is dislodged by cogent reason. Abdul Majid Khan v. Anwar Begum PLD 1989 SC 362 rel. Abdul Rehman Bhutto for Applicant. Nemo for Respondents Nos.1 to 4. Date of hearing: 18th January, 2024.

Summary: ----Ss.62 & 104(3)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Submission/ scrutiny of nomination papers for reserved seats---Powers of Returning Officer of the constituency---Transgression---Invoking constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Petitioner (a political party nominated candidate) filed constitutional petition as Returning Officer of her constituency for general seats rejected her nomination papers for reserved seats for women---Validity---Petitioner submitted two nomination papers before Returning Office of relevant constituency at the relevant office, one for general seat for the National Assembly and second for the reserved seat of women for National Assembly from her political party---Record reveals that the nomination papers for the reserved seats for women from her political party were rejected by the said RO---Indisputably, though the said RO was authorized and competent to scrutinize the nomination papers of the candidates from the said constituency for general seats, but had absolutely no authority and power either to accept or reject the nomination papers of a party nominated candidate for the reserved seats as per priority list---Provincial Election Commissioner (PEC) was appointed as Returning Officer for the seats reserved for women and non-Muslims, thus, he (PEC/RO) was competent alone for receipt of nomination papers, scrutiny and decision thereon---In the present case, the petitioner had filed nomination papers for reserved seats for women before the RO of the constituency instead of filing the same before the PEC/RO, which error could have been rectified and corrected by the RO of constituency either by transmitting the nomination papers to the PEC/RO or could have returned the nomination papers to the petitioner to file the same before the competent Returning Officer i.e. (PEC/RO), but the RO of constituency rejected her nomination papers without any lawful authority and jurisdiction, which indeed was required to be rectified and corrected by High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Art. 199 of the Constitution in order to meet the ends of justice as an aggrieved person cannot be left remediless---High Court declared the order of rejection of the nomination papers null and void and directed the matter to be transmitted to the Provincial Election Commissioner being RO of the reserved seats for women, who after due scrutiny shall render decision thereon forthwith in accordance with law---Consti-tutional petition was allowed accordingly. Khalid Ahmed Kubdani and Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din Sasoli for Petitioner. Shehzad Aslam, AD Law and Naseer Ahmed, Senior Personal Assistant ECP for Official Respondents. Date of hearing: 1st February, 2024.

Summary: ----S. 95(5), (6), (7) & (8)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Consolidation of results---Recounting of ballot papers---Jurisdiction of Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP)---Scope---Interference by ECP after completion of process of consolidation of results by Returning Officer (R.O.)---Legality---Long investigation of ECP in resolving the controversy as to consolidation of results---Effect---Plea of haste on part of R.O. in completing the consolidation results---Validity---Recount of ballot papers and the power to be exercised by ECP has to be done before conclusion of the consolidation proceedings and if the exercise of power is not completed as contemplated by S.95(6), of Elections Act, 2017 ECP cannot thereafter proceed to exercise such power on the misplaced notion that it can do so by invoking the provisions of S.8 of the Elections Act, 2017, (Act) or any other provision in law or the Constitution---ECP delayed the matter and initiated inquiries into the entire process of election,which was not the mandate of S.95(6) of the Act as when an application was made to ECP it merely had to see whether the R.O. had proceeded in accordance with law while refusing recount of votes under the powers conferred by S.95(5) and no more---In any case, it could only have done so prior to completion of the consolidation proceedings by the Returning Officer---Returning Officer could have awaited the period prescribed for consolidation proceedings to be completed and given in proviso to S.95(7)of the Act but that was for ECP to instruct the R.Os. and indeed some time must be given to ECP to exercise its powers in terms of S.95(6) of the Act---Provision for further time in that regard could only be done by an amendment in the law regarding which High Court was not empowered to issue a direction and it was for the legislature to look into the same---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Ch. Bilal Ejaz v. Election Commission of Pakistan and others (W.P. No.16416 of 2024) rel. Abid Hussain Khichi for Petitioner. Muhammad Shan Gul for Respondent No.3. Asad Ali Bajwa and Ch. Imtiaz Elahi, D.A.Gs. Hassan Ijaz Cheema, A.A.G. Imran Arif Ranjha, Legal Advisor for E.C.P with Haroon Kasi, Director (Law) and Bushra Rasheed Chaudhry, Deputy Director Law ECP. Date of hearing: 15th May, 2024.

Summary: ----S. 115, O. XXIII, Rr. 2 & 3---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 5, 29(2) & First Sched., Art. 162-A---Suit for recovery of money---Limitation---Permission to file fresh suit---Petitioner/Government assailed judgment and decree passed by two Courts below in favour of respondent/plaintiff---Petitioner/Government sought condonation of delay and contended that second suit filed by respondent/plaintiff was barred by limitation---Validity---Period of 90 days for filing of revision has been prescribed under Art. 162-A in First Schedule to Limitation Act, 1908---Bar prescribed by S. 29(2) of Limitation Act, 1908 does not apply to civil revision---Lower Appellate Court passed judgment and decree on 20-02-2020 and civil revision petition was governed by newly inserted Art. 162-A in Limitation Act, 1908, at the time of its filing---In province of Balochistan, provision of S. 5 of Limitation Act, 1908, was applicable to civil revision petitions filed under S. 115, C.P.C. for condonation of delay in filing petitions---Petitioners/Government obtained certified copy of judgment and decree on 11-11-2020, but the petition was filed on 30-11-2020---Delay of nineteen days was not explained---High Court declined to condone delay caused in filing of revision petition---Limitation of ninety days under Art. 162-A of First Schedule to Limitation Act, 1908 is relevant only when civil revision petition is filed by party to proceedings---Such impediment is non-existent when Court itself exercises jurisdiction under S. 115(1), C.P.C.---First suit which had been withdrawn was not to be considered and time spent on such suit was not to be deducted for the purpose of limitation even when permission to institute a fresh suit had been granted---Respondent/defendant was allowed to institute a fresh suit subject to all just and legal exceptions---Time spent in prosecution of first suit could not be excluded under O. XXIII, R. 2, C.P.C. for the purpose of limitation---High Court in exercise of suo motu revisional jurisdiction set aside judgment and decrees passed in favour of respondent/plaintiff by Trial Court and Lower Appellate Court---Revision was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----S. 3---Limitation---Scope---Provision of S. 3 of Limitation Act, 1908 is mandatory and question of limitation is a statutory provision which cannot be waived---It is not left to the parties to take or not to take an objection that suit is outside the time limit fixed by First Schedule to Limitation Act, 1908---Court must dismiss suit if it has been instituted after period of limitation prescribed for the same by First Schedule to Limitation Act, 1908. Saifullah Sanjrani, Assistant Advocate General for Petitioners. Syed Ayaz Zahoor for Respondent. Date of hearing: 8th October, 2024.