Summary: Election Appeal: Mr. Shoaib Shaheen nominated for NA 46 has been rejected. Hence this Appeal.

Summary: Rejected the appellant's nomination papers for PP-174. The rejection was based on the proposer Muhammad Ramzan's name not being found on the electoral roll for PP-174, as required by the Elections Act, 2017.The appellant argued that the error was inadvertent, resulting from confusion between two constituencies (PP-173 and PP-174), and requested substitution with another proposer, Waqas Tassawer. Legal precedents, including Rana Muhammad Tajammal Hussain v. Rana Shaukat Mahmood (PLD 2007 SC 277) and Sharafat Ali v. D.R.O. and others (2008 SCMR 539), were cited to support the contention that such defects are curable.However, the Election Commission of Pakistan opposed the appeal, emphasizing the foundational role of the proposer in the nomination process and arguing that defects related to proposer eligibility are not curable. The legal advisor cited relevant sections of the Elections Act, 2017, and referred to Jamshed Iqbal Cheema v. Election Appellate Tribunal (2022 CLC 463) and Ijaz v. Returning Officer PP-115, Faisalabad (W.P. No.223502 of 2018), as precedents.After careful consideration, the court upheld the Returning Officer's decision, citing the mandatory nature of proposer requirements under the Act. The court emphasized that defects related to the proposer's eligibility are of a substantial nature and cannot be cured at a subsequent stage. The appellant's argument that the defect was curable was deemed meritless, and the appeal was dismissed. The court approved the order for reporting.

Summary: The rejection was primarily based on the uncertainty regarding the genuineness of the signatures of the candidate, proposer, and seconder.During the proceedings on 06.01.2024, the Returning Officer confirmed the authenticity of the signatures after being asked by the Court. However, another objection was vaguely referred to, related to the absence of particulars of a bank account for documenting election expenses in the declaration against item No.3 of the nomination papers.The Legal Advisor of the Election Commission of Pakistan explained that the relevant provision is section 60(2)(b), amended by the Elections Amendment (Act), 2023, requiring candidates to provide bank account details at the scrutiny of nomination papers. The appellant's counsel argued that a dormant account had been reactivated for election expenses, and a certified copy of the bank statement was presented.The Court, citing Yasir Aftab v. Irfan Gull and others (2023 SCMR 206), emphasized that scrutiny is a two-step process, and Returning Officers have the discretion to allow curing of certain defects if immediately remediable by the appellant. The omission regarding the bank account, though noted by the Returning Officer, was not properly recorded in the order. The appellant promptly provided the required bank statement, leading the Court to conclude that the defect was cured.Therefore, the Court declared the order of the Returning Officer legally untenable, set it aside, and directed the Returning Officer to accept the nomination papers. The concerned Returning Officer was instructed to include the appellant's name in the revised list of validly nominated candidates in accordance with section 64(3) of the Elections Act, 2017.

Summary: The rejection was based on the non-availability of the appellant, his proposer, and seconder during the scrutiny stage --- Malik Zaheer Abbas filed an election appeal challenging the rejection of his nomination papers for NA-127. The Returning Officer (RO) had rejected the papers, citing the unavailability of the appellant, his proposer, and seconder during scrutiny. Additionally, the RO alleged non-disclosure of a tractor and motorcycle in the appellant's declaration Form ?B.?The appellant's counsel argued that the absence during scrutiny was due to circumstances beyond their control. The individuals were now present, examined by the RO, and satisfied as to their identity. The counsel further contended that the non-disclosure of the mentioned assets was unintentional, and documents presented through C.M. No.2 of 2024 supported the appellant's claim.Legal precedents, including S. Zafar Ali Shah v. Muhammad Younas Elahi (1989 CLC 88), M/s. Eastern General Insurance Company Limited v. Azhar Ali and others (PLD 1993 SC 158), Syed Wasey Zafar and 4 others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance and others (PLD 1994 SC 621), and Mst. Shaheen Begum v. S.H.O. (ACLC) and others (2005 MLD 176), were cited to argue that the sale of goods had transferred ownership, absolving the appellant of deliberate concealment. The counsel emphasized that any finding of false declaration should require evidence of deliberate, intentional, and mala fide concealment, which was lacking in this case.Referring to Syed Fida Hussain Shah v. Election Appellate Tribunal and others (PLD 2018 Lahore 788), Shamona Badshah Qaisarani v. Election Tribunal, Multan and others (2021 SCMR 988), and Yasir Aftab v. Irfan Gul and others (2023 SCMR 206), the appellant's counsel asserted that there was no gain for the appellant in non-disclosure, and the belief that the assets no longer belonged to him was bona fide.The court, after scrutinizing the impugned order, found it lacking rationality and proportionality. The rejection of the nomination papers was set aside, and the RO was directed to include the appellant's name in the revised list of validly nominated candidates for NA-127.

Summary: Order suspended by SC order on 18-3-24, next date of hearing 22-4-24 ---- ''All property taxes collected by the cantonment boards in Sindh declared as illegal. It is beyond the jurisdiction of the boards to make any such collections after the 18th amendment, as property tax is now solely a provincial subject. ---- ''Background:The case involves a series of petitions, led by the Millennium Mall Management Co. against the Government of Pakistan and other connected entities, challenging the tax demand based on the annual rental value of property imposed by different Cantonment Boards. The petitioners argue that such taxation is within the exclusive domain of the provinces post the 18th Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan and that the Cantonment Boards, under the federal government, do not have the authority to levy these taxes.-----Issues:The core issue revolves around the legislative competence to levy tax based on the annual rental value of property post the 18th Amendment. The petitioners contest that this authority rests solely with the provinces, while the federal government and Cantonment Boards assert their right under various legislative acts.----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The High Court of Sindh at Karachi held that post the 18th Amendment, the federal government and Cantonment Boards lack the legislative competence to impose taxes on immovable property, including taxes based on annual rental value. The Court concluded that such authority now exclusively resides with the provincial governments. The decision was supported by an examination of constitutional amendments, legislative competencies, and precedents that delineate the separation of powers between federal and provincial authorities concerning tax imposition.----Citations/Precedents:18th Amendment to the Constitution of PakistanVarious judgments clarifying the legislative competence of federal and provincial governments in the context of tax imposition, including cases like Pakistan through Ministry of Defence v. Province of Punjab (PLD 1975 SC 37), Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1988 SC 416), and recent judgments that interpret the scope and application of legislative entries in the context of tax on immovable properties.The High Court's decision emphasizes the constitutional boundaries that delineate federal and provincial powers, particularly in the realm of taxation, reinforcing the autonomy granted to provinces in certain legislative areas post the 18th Amendment.

Summary: Background: Two writ petitions, No. 53/2023 and No. 3452/2023, were filed involving a dispute over land ownership and allotment between WAPDA, Mirpur Development Authority (MDA), and private individuals in the Mangla Dam area of Mirpur, Azad Kashmir. Writ Petition No. 53/2023: WAPDA claimed ownership of the land acquired for Mangla Dam, asserting that the MDA illegally allotted plots on this land without obtaining the necessary No Objection Certificate (NOC) from WAPDA. Writ Petition No. 3452/2023: Private petitioners, who had purchased plots from MDA, alleged that WAPDA was interfering with their construction activities despite having obtained proper allotments and NOCs from relevant authorities. ----Issues: 1- Whether the MDA legally allotted the plots on the land acquired by WAPDA for the Mangla Dam. 2- Whether WAPDA retains ownership and the right to interfere with the plots allotted by the MDA. 3- Whether the private purchasers' rights to the plots are protected and enforceable against WAPDA's claims. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court examined the agreement between WAPDA and the Government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, which stated that the land not required for the Mangla Dam project would revert to the state. It was found that the MDA, acting on behalf of the state, legally allotted the plots to private individuals. WAPDA’s claim of ownership was based on providing funds for the land acquisition. However, the court held that once the land was acquired and the specific purpose (Mangla Dam) was fulfilled, the state retained sovereignty and ownership rights. The court observed that the MDA had the authority to allot the plots and had done so in compliance with legal procedures, including obtaining necessary NOCs. The court dismissed Writ Petition No. 53/2023 filed by WAPDA, holding that WAPDA had no cause of action as it no longer possessed the land. The court accepted Writ Petition No. 3452/2023, restraining WAPDA and other respondents from interfering with the petitioners' lawful possession and use of the plots. ----Citations/Precedents: Agreement between WAPDA and the Government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (24.06.1967). Judgment in "Department of WAPDA Vs Raja Maroof and others" (18.02.2021).

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 ----S. 2(h)(i), S. 4(4)(i)(a) Harassment Defined by Victim’s Perspective—Text Messages Constituting Unwelcome Conduct Maintainability—Complainant alleged repeated harassment by the Accused, including unwelcome text messages, demands to show her face, and unsolicited arrangements for accommodations—Held, harassment under S. 2(h)(i) includes unwelcome written communication of a sexual nature, as perceived by the victim—Supreme Court precedent reinforces that the victim’s perspective and standard of a reasonable woman are paramount—Text message of 14-11-2019 deemed harassment due to its unwelcome nature and impact on the Complainant. Cited Cases:Nadia Naz v. President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (PLD 2023 SC 588) Asif Saleem v. Chairman BOG University of Lahore (PLD 2019 Lah 407) (b) Burden of Proof and Evidence Difficulties in Producing Evidence in Harassment Cases—Supporting Testimony Sufficient Contention—Accused challenged lack of documentary evidence, including CCTV footage or receipts for alleged events—Held, Clause xii of the Act acknowledges the inherent difficulty in producing direct evidence in harassment cases—Corroborative testimony of Mr. Yousaf Afridi confirmed the Complainant’s allegations and strengthened her case, outweighing the absence of material evidence. (c) Motive and Credibility of Allegations Absence of Malicious Intent—Credibility of Complainant’s Claims Upheld Statutory Interpretation—Accused failed to substantiate claims of malicious intent by the Complainant—Principle of prudence suggests that a woman is unlikely to file a false harassment complaint at the cost of her dignity—Held, Complainant’s allegations credible and supported by corroborative testimony. (d) Appeal Outcome Minor Penalty Imposed—Caution Against Future Misconduct Held—Accused found guilty of harassment under S. 2(h)(i)—Minor penalty of censure imposed under S. 4(4)(i)(a) with strict caution to refrain from similar conduct in the future—Complaint allowed.

Summary: Summary Pending