Summary: (a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre‑emption Act, 1987 --- S. 13 (Talbs) --- Talb‑i‑Muwathibat—Proof of informer—Failure fatal— Appellant claimed he proclaimed his intention to pre‑empt immediately upon learning of the sale from one Akbar Shah, yet never produced the informer in evidence. Supreme Court held the foundational requirement of naming and examining the informer is mandatory; non‑production leaves time, place, and mode of knowledge uncorroborated, attracting an adverse presumption. Concurrent findings upholding performance of Talb‑i‑Muwathibat were founded on mis‑reading of evidence and were rightly reversed in revision. Cited cases: Abdul Rehman v. Haji Ghazan Khan 2007 SCMR 1491; Subhanuddin v. Pir Ghulam PLD 2015 SC 69. (b) Pre‑emption—Shafī‑e‑Khalīt (contiguous owner) —Requirement of strict contiguity— Local commission and CWs confirmed Khasra No. 225, recorded as “Chair Mumkin Nijji Raasta” (private passage), lay between appellant’s Khasra No. 226 and the suit Khasra No. 223/1. Mere building a retaining wall or exercising possessory control over part of another Khasra does not create contiguity absent ownership. Trial and appellate courts ignored this critical fact; High Court correctly held appellant was not a Shafī‑e‑Khalīt. (c) Pre‑emption—Shafī‑e‑Jār (common irrigation) —Topographical bar— Appellant’s field lay at a markedly higher elevation than the communal water channel; irrigation from the claimed source was physically impossible. Absence of common source negated status as Shafī‑e‑Jār. Findings of courts below were perverse and liable to correction. (d) Talb‑i‑Ishhād—Statutory mode of notice— Appellant admitted he did not dispatch the notice himself; alleged intermediary (Akbar Shah) not produced; notice was not sent by registered post with acknowledgment‑due as expressly required by S. 13(3) of the 1987 Act. Procedural non‑compliance rendered Talb‑i‑Ishhād invalid. (e) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 --- S. 115—Revisional jurisdiction—Scope to upset concurrent findings— Where trial and first appellate courts commit non‑reading, mis‑reading, or misconstruction of material evidence, High Court may justifiably exercise revisional powers to rectify the error and prevent miscarriage of justice. Impugned revision fell squarely within this ambit. Disposition: Appeal dismissed; High Court judgment dated 15‑06‑2016 upheld; appellant’s suit for pre‑emption finally dismissed.

Summary: Background: A civil revision petition was filed against the judgment and decree of an appellate court, which had decreed a suit for possession through pre-emption. The plaintiffs (respondents in this case) claimed superior rights of pre-emption over a property sold through an oral sale mutation. They contended that the sale was done secretly at an inflated price to avoid their pre-emption rights. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the appellate court reversed this decision, leading the defendants (petitioners) to file the present civil revision. ----Issues: 1- Did the respondents validly fulfill the requirements of Talb-i-Muwathibat (immediate declaration of intent) and Talb-i-Ishhad (formal demand by notice)? 2- Could the brother of a minor plaintiff act as a guardian in a pre-emption case and make the necessary Talbs on behalf of the minor? 3- Did the respondents provide credible evidence to support their claim of pre-emption, including the actual sale price and the validity of the demands? ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The civil revision was allowed, and the appellate court’s judgment and decree were set aside. The court ruled that the respondents failed to prove the performance of the required Talbs as per law. There were contradictions in the testimony of the respondents' witnesses, including inconsistencies in their accounts of the events related to Talb-i-Muwathibat and Talb-i-Ishhad. The court also noted that the guardian of a minor plaintiff did not have the authority to perform these Talbs, and no evidence was presented to show that the demands were made on behalf of the minor. The court further observed that the respondents intentionally understated the sale price in their plaint to gain an undue advantage, which violated the provisions of the Shari’ah applicable to pre-emption cases. The non-appearance of the alleged informer, who initially informed the respondents of the sale, also weakened their case. As a result, the suit for possession through pre-emption was dismissed. ----Citations/Precedents: SUBHANUDDIN and others vs. PIR GHULAM (PLD 2015 Supreme Court 69) ABDUL QAYYUM vs. MUHAMMAD SADIQ (2007 SCMR 957) DILSHAD BEGUM vs. Mst. NISAR AKHTAR (PLJ 2012 SC 912) MUHAMMAD MAL KHAN vs. ALLAH YAR KHAN (2002 SCMR 235) ABDUL REHMAN vs. Haji GHAZAN KHAN (2007 SCMR 1491) FARID ULLAH KHAN vs. IRFAN ULLAH KHAN (2022 SCMR 1231) MUHAMMAD RIAZ vs. MUHAMMAD AKRAM and others (2024 SCMR 692)

Summary: Background:In Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Zafar Iqbal filed a civil revision against judgments dismissing his suit for possession through pre-emption against Muhammad Amjad Shami. The original suit and the subsequent appeal were dismissed by the civil judge and the Additional District Judge in Chichawatni, respectively.----Issues:Whether the petitioner Zafar Iqbal established the necessary legal steps (Talb-e-Muwathibat and Talb-e-Ishhad) required to exercise his right of pre-emption.Whether the procedural requirements for notice and its service were satisfied.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The High Court upheld the dismissal of the petitioner's claim. The court found that the petitioner failed to establish several critical elements required for a successful pre-emption claim:The petitioner did not adequately document or prove the Talb-e-Muwathibat (the formal demand made immediately upon learning of the sale) as required by law.The petitioner also failed to demonstrate that he met the procedural requirements for Talb-e-Ishhad (subsequent formal notice of the pre-emption claim), particularly regarding the service of notice to the respondent. The service was attempted on a third party not authorized to receive it on behalf of the respondent, who was out of the country.The court noted discrepancies in the petitioner's evidence regarding the location and circumstances of the Talb-e-Muwathibat and found the witness testimonies unreliable.These shortcomings led to the conclusion that the petitioner's attempt to preempt the sale was procedurally flawed and substantively unproven. The court cited extensive precedent emphasizing the strict requirements for proving pre-emption claims under Pakistani law.----Citations/Precedents:Ch. Riaz Ahmad v. Munir Sultan Malik [2022 SCMR 667]Mir Muhammad Khan and 2 others v. Haider and others [PLD 2020 SC 233]Dr. Pir Muhammad Khan v. Khuda Bukhsh and others [2015 SCMR 1243]Muhammad Amin v. Zulfiqar and another [2014 SCMR 667]Muhammad Hanif v. Tariq Mehmood and others [2014 SCMR 941]Allah Ditta through L.Rs. and others v. Muhammad Anar [2013 SCMR 866]Munawar Hussain and others v. Afaq Ahmed [2013 SCMR 721]Muhammad Ismail v. Muhammad Yousaf [2012 SCMR 911]Fazal ur Rehman v. Khurshid Ali and another [2012 SCMR 635]Section Officer, Government of the Punjab, Finance Department and others v. Ghulam Shabbir [2011 SCMR 1545]

Summary: Background:The petitioner, Riasat Ali Sahi, filed a suit seeking to preempt the sale of land executed through a sale deed dated 23.2.2008, claiming a superior right of preemption. The sale was contested, and the suit was ultimately dismissed by the learned Civil Judge and the appeal by the learned Additional District Judge.----Issues:Whether the petitioner had a superior right of preemption.Whether the requisite Talbs (notices of preemption) were proven as per legal requirements.----Holding:The court dismissed the revision petition, upholding the decisions of the lower courts. It found that the petitioner failed to establish a superior right of preemption and did not adequately prove the requisite Talbs, as per the Punjab Preemption Act, 1991.----Citations and Precedents:Haq Nawaz v. Muhammad Kabir (2009 SCMR 630)Mian Pir Muhammad v. Faqir Muhammad (PLD 2007 SC 302)Muhammad Akram and another v. Ghulam Sarwar (2013 MLD 1662)----Outcome:The revision petition was dismissed, affirming the decisions of the lower courts. The petitioner's claims regarding the superior right of preemption and the validity of Talbs were not upheld.

Summary: 'Discussion: (1) Clause (d) of Section 2, Section 6 and 13 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987 (2) Construction of the terms ?sitting?, ?meeting? and ?(majlis)? (3) Interpretation of words in parentheses (4) The effect of statutory notice of talb-e-ishhad on printed form/stereotyped specimen/sample.'''The central issue revolved around the validity of a notice of talb-e-ishhad (Ex.P.W.3/2) served by the appellant, which was in a printed pro forma or template form. This notice played a pivotal role in asserting the appellant's right of pre-emption under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987 ("1987 Act"). The Court embarked on a thorough analysis of the legal framework surrounding the right of pre-emption, particularly focusing on the statutory requirements and their interpretation.The Court delved into the essence of the right of pre-emption, highlighting its significance within the Islamic concept of Shufaa or pre-emption. It underscored the fundamental rationale behind this right, which aims to safeguard the privacy and tranquility of a specific area of immovable property and prevent the intrusion of strangers. The Court referred to authoritative sources like the Hidaya and D. F. Mulla's book "Principles of Muhammadan Law" to provide comprehensive insights into the philosophical and legal foundations of pre-emption.Furthermore, the Court meticulously examined the relevant provisions of the 1987 Act, particularly Section 13, which imposes certain prerequisites for the assertion of the right of pre-emption. It elucidated the importance of three distinct stages in the process: talb-e-muwathibat, talb-e-ishhad, and talb-e-khusumat, each serving a specific purpose in confirming the intention to exercise the right of pre-emption. The Court emphasized the imperative nature of compliance with these statutory provisions and the necessity of adhering to the prescribed procedures.Crucially, the Court addressed the contentious issue of whether a notice of talb-e-ishhad could be valid if presented in a printed pro forma or template format. It invoked several legal authorities and precedents to substantiate its position. Notably, it referred to the Supreme Court of India's judgment in Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. and Ors. v. Jindal Exports Ltd. and Ors., emphasizing the significance of parentheses in legislative texts and the need to give meaning to each word used by the legislature.The Court underscored the principle that statutory notices should be customized to convey specific information based on the circumstances of each case. It argued that using a ready-made format or template notice would undermine the purpose of providing prior notice and render the requirement mere formality. The Court also rejected the argument that the appellant's illiteracy should excuse such lapses, emphasizing the appellant's duty to seek legal assistance if needed.--- The Court found no merit in the appellant's contentions and upheld the decision of the High Court. It relied on the precedent set by its earlier judgment in C.P. No. 1015/2014 and C.A.s No. 1561 and 1562 of 2014, which affirmed the High Court's position. Therefore, the Civil Appeal was dismissed, affirming the validity of the High Court's judgment.

Summary: Background:In Civil Appeal Nos. 170 & 171 of 2017, Hasham Khan (deceased) through LRs. (the appellants) challenged the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi in Civil Revision Nos. 688-D of 2011 and Civil Revision No. 689-D of 2011. The appeals stemmed from two separate suits of preemption filed by the respondent-plaintiff, Waheed Ahmed, seeking to preempt the sale of land to the appellants, claiming co-ownership rights in the land.---Issues:Whether the respondent-plaintiff proved his right of preemption on the sale of land.Whether the respondent-plaintiff successfully proved the performance of Talabs in accordance with the law.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The court found that the respondent-plaintiff failed to prove his right of preemption on the basis of co-ownership against the appellants. The entry in the Register of Record of Rights did not carry the presumption of correctness under Section 52 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act 1967, as it was not proven through independent evidence. Additionally, the respondent-plaintiff's notice of Talb-e-Ishhad was not properly proven, and there were contradictions in the evidence regarding the performance of Talabs. Therefore, the court concluded that the respondent-plaintiff failed to establish his right of preemption and the performance of Talabs in accordance with the law.As a result, the court allowed the appeals, dismissing the suits of the plaintiff-respondent with costs throughout.---Citations/Precedents:Pervez Alam Khan vs. Muhammad Mukhtar Khan (2001 CLC 1489)Shad Muhammad v. Khan Poor (PLD 1986 SC 91)Punjab Land Revenue Act 1967

Summary: Facts:The appellants, Kashmali Khan and others, sought to exercise their right of pre-emption under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987, regarding a land sale to the respondent, Mst. Malala. The lower courts initially favored the appellants, but the High Court reversed this decision, leading to the current appeal.---Procedural History:The case originated from a suit for pre-emption. The trial court and the appellate court ruled in favor of the appellants, but their decree was reversed by the High Court upon the respondent's revision application.---Issue:Whether the appellants satisfied the necessary formalities for exercising the right of pre-emption, particularly concerning the demands or "Talbs."----Holding:The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's decision that the appellants failed to meet the pre-emption formalities.---Reasoning:The Court found that the appellants did not properly execute the "Talb-i-Ishhad" (demand by establishing evidence), a key requirement for pre-emption. Specifically, the appellants failed to:Mention the names of the witnesses for Talb-i-Ishhad in their plaint, a crucial omission that the Court deemed fatal to their claim.Expressly confirm their intention to exercise the right of pre-emption when making Talb-i-Ishhad, as required by law.The notice sent to the vendee (Ex.PW 4/3) did not bear the signatures of any appellants, raising doubts about its validity.The Court rejected the argument that the appellants could make Talb-i-Ishhad through an agent (their lawyer), as there was no proven disability preventing them from making the demand themselves, nor was there explicit authorization given to the agent.---Comments:This judgment emphasizes the strict adherence required to the procedural formalities in exercising the right of pre-emption under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act. The Court's stringent application of these requirements highlights the delicate balance between protecting property rights and allowing for traditional claims like pre-emption.

Summary: ''Discussion: (1) Principle of estoppel and approbation and reprobation. (2) Proof of Talb-i-Muwathibat & Talb-i-Ishhad (3) Article 129 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 read with Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 with regard to presumption of service.'' --- Facts:The petitioner filed a suit for possession via pre-emption concerning a property in Village Khopra, alleging the respondents purchased it, disguising the true sale consideration to defeat the petitioner's right of pre-emption as a co-sharer and participant in special rights associated with the land.The petitioner, upon learning of the sale, executed Talb-i-Muwathibat (initial demand) and Talb-i-Ishhad (demand by establishing evidence), but the respondents refused to recognize his pre-emption rights.The Trial Court issued a decree in favor of the petitioner for one respondent's share, which was later contested and set aside, leading to the dismissal of the petitioner's suit and subsequent appeals.---Issue:Whether the Lahore High Court erred in dismissing the petitioner's second appeal, particularly regarding the principles of partial pre-emption and the performance of "Talbs" (demands).---Holding:The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and declined leave to appeal, upholding the Lahore High Court's judgment.---Rationale:The Court found that partial decrees in pre-emption suits are generally not permissible, and the petitioner failed to deposit the required amount as Zar-e-Soam (earnest money), thus not complying with the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991.The petitioner's conduct was questioned, with findings that he had prior knowledge of the sale and participated in related proceedings, thus being estopped from claiming ignorance of the sale.The evidence provided by the petitioner to establish Talb-i-Muwathibat and Talb-i-Ishhad was deemed insufficient, particularly due to the lack of specific dates and proper acknowledgment of notice delivery.The Supreme Court found no legal or jurisdictional defects in the Lahore High Court's judgment that warranted its interference.---Decision:The Supreme Court found the concurrent findings of the lower courts to be appropriate and dismissed the civil petition for lack of merit.

Summary: Facts:The dispute revolves around the right of pre-emption concerning a piece of land that was sold and subsequently exchanged by the respondents. The appellants claimed the right of pre-emption over this transaction, asserting that they had fulfilled the necessary legal formalities, including Talb-e-Muwathibat (immediate assertion of the right upon learning of the sale) and Talb-e-Ishhad (formal declaration of the intention to claim pre-emption in the presence of witnesses).---Issue:Whether the appellants effectively fulfilled the legal requirements for claiming the right of pre-emption, particularly concerning the formalities of Talb-e-Muwathibat and Talb-e-Ishhad.---Holding:The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the Lahore High Court's decision that favored the respondents.---Reasoning:The Supreme Court emphasized the stringent criteria that must be met to establish the right of pre-emption. The Court pointed out several deficiencies in the appellants' claim, particularly regarding the performance of Talb-e-Ishhad. The appellants failed to directly serve notice to all concerned parties, a necessary step to validly assert the right of pre-emption. This lack of direct notification raised doubts about the appellants' compliance with the procedural formalities required for claiming pre-emption rights.---Judgment:The appeal was dismissed, and the Lahore High Court's judgment, which reinstated the Trial Court's decision in favor of the respondents, was upheld.

Summary: The main point of contention in the appeal was the timing and validity of the first talb (demand of pre-emption) made by the respondent. The appellants argued that the talb was not made in a timely manner as required by law. They contended that even a slight delay in making the talb would disentitle the pre-emptor from claiming the right of pre-emption. The appellants sought to challenge the findings of the lower courts and requested the Supreme Court to overturn the judgments. The Supreme Court noted that the appellants were challenging three concurrent findings from the lower courts, which had thoroughly considered the evidence and the law. The burden was on the appellants to demonstrate a clear error in those findings to warrant interference by the Supreme Court. The specific argument focused on the respondent's knowledge of the sale prior to the registration of the sale deed, which was considered relevant for the first talb. The Court referred to the relevant provisions of the NWFP Pre-Emption Act, 1987, and a previous judgment of the Supreme Court in Muhammad Nafeez Khan v Qulbat Khan and others 2012 SCMR 235. The Court acknowledged certain reservations about the cited case but concluded that the question of knowledge of the sale was a matter of fact to be determined based on the evidence presented. The Court found that the appellants had not specifically pleaded or provided evidence to establish that the respondent's knowledge of the sale was based on the date mentioned in the written statement of the vendor. Therefore, the Court determined that making a new finding of fact in this regard would be based on speculation rather than evidence. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, upholding the judgments of the lower courts.