Summary: (a) Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act (XII of 2011)--- ----S.24B---Term “may deem fit”---Scope---Deeming provision in S.24B of Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011, has provided Sindh Revenue Board an opportunity to bring a person within registration process, and then initiate recovery from the date such person becomes liable for tax payment. (b) Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act (XII of 2011)--- ----Ss. 3 & 9--- Recovery of sales tax on services ---Pre-condition---It is sine qua non for a person to be susceptible to levy of a tax, before the subsequent processes of assessment and recovery can become applicable. (c) Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act (XII of 2011)--- ----Ss. 3, 9, 24A, 24B & 63---Recovery of sales tax on services---Unregistered service provider---Effect---Authorities were aggrieved of judgment passed by Appellate Tribunal, Sindh Revenue Board, holding that no assessment order could be passed against unregistered service provider---Validity---If levying sections of Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011, remained inapplicable to respondents who were unregistered at the relevant time, then it would follow that the assessment and recovery process also could not be initiated, since the respondents / unregistered service providers fell wide of the levy itself---Authorities did not force registration upon respondents / unregistered service providers during such time, by invoking S. 24B of Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011 nor at such time the respondents / unregistered service providers voluntarily registered under S. 24A of Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011---Such tardiness of alleged collection was attributed to authorities as there was a specific clause (i.e. 24B of Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011) that existed for them to encompass respondents / unregistered service providers into registration and within the tax recovery web, which they failed to do so at such time---Respondents / unregistered service providers could voluntarily register themselves with the Authorities, or could be compulsorily registered by Authorities / Sindh Revenue Board in accordance with law, after which the process for ascertainment and recovery of sales tax on services could be sought from them---Taxable persons avoiding registration would also additionally be answerable to various penalties/ramifications provided under the provision of Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011, applicable upon them---Reference was answered accordingly. 2019 PTD 2338; 2015 PTD 796; PLD 2018 SC 189; PLD 2020 Sindh 62; 2023 PTD 825; Federation of Pakistan v. Mian Muhd. Nawaz Sharif PLD 2009 SC 644; H.M. Extraction’s case 2019 SCMR 1081; Allied Bank Ltd. v. Commissioner Income Tax Lahore 2023 SCMR 1166; 1970 SCMR 105; 1993 SCMR 1111; 2021 PTD 484 and PLD 1967 SC 241 rel. Malik Waseem Iqbal (in SSTRAs Nos.70/2022, 2092/2023 along with Zamir Ali Khalid, Commissioner (Legal), SRB for the Applicants. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Abdul Manan and Shamshad Ahmed (in SSTRAs Nos.349/2019, 330/2020, 71, 73, 132/2021, 71, 95, 170, 174/2022, 54, 59, 60, 62, 76, 94, 168 of 2024). Muhammad Farhan for Applicant (in SSTRAs No.100 of 2025). Qazi Umair Ali and Muhammad Inzimam Shareef for Respondent (in SSTRA No.73 of 2021). Aqeel Ahmed for Respondent (in SSTRA No.62 of 2024). Shams Mohiuddin Ansari for Respondent (in SSTRA No.60 of 2024) Shoaib Noor for Respondent (in SSTRA No.54 of 2024). Najeebullah for Respondent (in SSTRA No.132 of 2021). Muhammad Farhan for Respondent (in SSTRA No.59 of 2024). Date of hearing: 14 October, 2025. 1. Special Sales Tax Reference Application No.349/2019 Sindh Revenue Board v. M/s. Logon Broadband (Pvt.) Ltd. 2. SSTRA 330/2020 Sindh Revenue Board v. M/s. Logon Broadband (Pvt.) Ltd. 3. SSTRA No.71/2021 Sindh Revenue Board v. M/s. MYN (Pvt.) Ltd. 4. SSTRA No.73/2021 Sindh Revenue Board v. M/s. TCS Logistics (Pvt.) Ltd. 5. SSTRA No.117/2021 Sindh Revenue Board v. M/s. Noor Enterprises Hyderabad 6. SSTRA No.132/2021 Sindh Revenue Board v. M/s. Tracking World (Pvt.) Ltd. 7. SSTRA No.70/2022 Sindh Revenue Board through AC v. M/s. Web DNA Works (Pvt.)Ltd. 8. SSTRA No.71/2022 Sindh Revenue Board through AC v. M/s. Cyber Tech Communication 9. SSTRA No.95/2022 Sindh Revenue Board, Karachi v. Cross Check Communication (Pvt.) Ltd. Karachi 10. SSTRA No.170/2022 Sindh Revenue Board, Karachi v. M/s. Geo Entertainment Television (Pvt.) Ltd. 11. SSTRA No.174/2022 Sindh Revenue Board, Karachi v. M/s. CNPC Chaunqing Drilling Engineering Co. Ltd. 12. SSTRA No.802/2023 Sindh Revenue Board, Karachi v. M/s. Reliance Commodities (Pvt.) Ltd. Karachi 13. SSTRA No.1180/2023 Sindh Revenue Board, Karachi v. M/s. Dadan and Company, Daharki 14. SSTRA No.1856/2023 Sindh Revenue Board, Karachi v. M/s. Sky Canteen Contractor, Karachi 15. SSTRA No.2092/2023 Sindh Revenue Board, Karachi v. M/s. Airspeed Charter (SMC-Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore 16. SSTRA No.2093/2023 Sindh Revenue Board, Karachi v. M/s. Airspeed Charter (SMC-Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore 17. SSTRA No.54/2024 Sindh Revenue Board, Karachi v. M/s. Reliance Commodities (Pvt.) Ltd. Karachi 18. SSTRA No.59/2024 Sindh Revenue Board, Karachi v. M/s. Karsaz (Private) Limited, Karachi 19. SSTRA No.60/2024 Sindh Revenue Board, Karachi v. M/s. Consteel Construction (Pvt.) Ltd., Karachi 20 SSTRA No.62/2024 Sindh Revenue Board, Karachi v. M/s. Hilong Oil Services and Engineering Pak (Pvt.) Ltd. 21. SSTRA No.76/2024 Sindh Revenue Board, Karachi v. M/s. Nawab Brothers (Pvt.) Ltd., Karachi 22. SSTRA No.94/2024 Sindh Revenue Board, Karachi v. M/s. Ericsson Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd., Karachi 23. SSTRA No.168/2024 Sindh Revenue Board, Karachi v. M/s. Convolair (Pvt.) Ltd., Karachi 24 SSTRA No.100/2025 M/s. Dada Sons, Karachi v. The Commissioner, SRB Unit-30A, Karachi and others

Summary: (Against the order dated 15.11.2023 of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad passed in S.T.R. No. 15 of 2016). Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----Ss. 11(4) & 11(4A) [as introduced through Finance Act, 2016]--- Withholding agent, responsibility of---Introduction of provision of law---Applicability at relevant time---Scope---Petitioner (Allama Iqbal Open University /AIOU) being a university was involved in distance learning education for which the university prints its educational material by itself, instead of getting it printed from printers/publishers outside---In consequence of such activity, the Department treated the petitioner as withholding agent and made it responsible to deduct and deposit sales tax on taxable goods and services as were supplied to it---Validity---In the present case , Show Cause Notice did not disclose that under which provisions of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (‘the Act 1990’),the petitioner was supposed to act as withholding agent in respect of the supplies made to it and further to deduct tax and to file monthly return in said regard---Provision of Section 11(4) of the Act 1990 relates to short payment of tax or erroneous issuance of refund due to inadvertence, error or misconstruction, thus, envisages a situation requiring payment of amount by the person who is responsible for deficiency in payment of tax and in consequence whereof a Show Cause Notice could have been issued---There is, however, nothing in Section 11(4) of the Act 1990 which deals with the responsibility of withholding of taxes---The situations and events demonstrated in the Show Cause Notice were, in fact, covered in terms of Section 11(4A) which was introduced by the Finance Act, 2016, whereas, the tax periods disclosed in the Show Cause Notice were from July, 2012, to June, 2013---The provisions of Section 11(4A) of the Act 1990 which could have held the petitioner liable were not existence at the relevant time when the Show Cause Notice was issued and similarly the alleged default was not covered by Section 11(4) on which the order-in-original and order of the Commissioner was based---Although it was noted in the impugned order that Section 11(4A) was introduced through Finance Act, 2016, yet in the impugned order it was not demonstrated at all as to on what basis the petitioner could be saddled with the responsibility of being a withholding agent, and the rules which were referred to, could not be said to have been framed with reference to or in pursuance of Section 11(4A) of the Act 1990---Thus, the provisions of Section 11(4) of the Act 1990 were wrongly applied---The recovery provisions of Section 11(4A), in consequence of not deducting and/or depositing the tax, came much after the issuance of the Show Cause Notice via Finance Act, 2016 and could not at all have been pressed in service---Supreme Court set aside the impugned order of the High Court by converting the petition into appeal and allowed the same. Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record / Advocate Supreme Court and Fazle-e-Rabi, Deputy Director, AIOU and M. Ali Akbar, Treasury Officer, AIOU for Petitioner. Dr. Farhat Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent. Aysha Jamal, Additional Commissioner and Sehr Ali, Assistant Commissioner for Respondent. Date of hearing: 1st October, 2025.

Summary: (Against the order dated 15.11.2023 of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad passed in S.T.R. No. 15 of 2016). Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----Ss. 11(4) & 11(4A) [as introduced through Finance Act, 2016]--- Withholding agent, responsibility of---Introduction of provision of law---Applicability at relevant time---Scope---Petitioner (Allama Iqbal Open University /AIOU) being a university was involved in distance learning education for which the university prints its educational material by itself, instead of getting it printed from printers/publishers outside---In consequence of such activity, the Department treated the petitioner as withholding agent and made it responsible to deduct and deposit sales tax on taxable goods and services as were supplied to it---Validity---In the present case, Show-Cause Notice did not disclose that under which provisions of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (‘the Act 1990’),the petitioner was supposed to act as withholding agent in respect of the supplies made to it and further to deduct tax and to file monthly return in said regard---Provision of Section 11(4) of the Act 1990 relates to short payment of tax or erroneous issuance of refund due to inadvertence, error or misconstruction, thus, envisages a situation requiring payment of amount by the person who is responsible for deficiency in payment of tax and in consequence whereof a Show-Cause Notice could have been issued---There is, however, nothing in Section 11(4) of the Act, 1990 which deals with the responsibility of withholding of taxes---The situations and events demonstrated in the Show-Cause Notice were, in fact, covered in terms of Section 11(4A) which was introduced by the Finance Act, 2016, whereas, the tax periods disclosed in the Show-Cause Notice were from July, 2012, to June, 2013---The provisions of Section 11(4A) of the Act 1990 which could have held the petitioner liable were not existence at the relevant time when the Show-Cause Notice was issued and similarly the alleged default was not covered by Section 11(4) on which the order-in-original and order of the Commissioner was based---Although it was noted in the impugned order that Section 11(4A) was introduced through Finance Act, 2016, yet in the impugned order it was not demonstrated at all as to on what basis the petitioner could be saddled with the responsibility of being a withholding agent, and the rules which were referred to, could not be said to have been framed with reference to or in pursuance of Section 11(4A) of the Act, 1990---Thus, the provisions of Section 11(4) of the Act, 1990 were wrongly applied---The recovery provisions of Section 11(4A), in consequence of not deducting and/or depositing the tax, came much after the issuance of the Show Cause Notice via Finance Act, 2016 and could not at all have been pressed in service---Supreme Court set aside the impugned order of the High Court by converting the petition into appeal and allowed the same. Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record / Advocate Supreme Court and Fazle-e-Rabi, Deputy Director, AIOU and M. Ali Akbar, Treasury Officer, AIOU for Petitioner. Dr. Farhat Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent. Aysha Jamal, Additional Commissioner and Sehr Ali, Assistant Commissioner for Respondent. Date of hearing: 1st October, 2025.

Summary: (a) Sales Tax Act, 1990 (VII of 1990) ----S. 11(4) & (4A) — Withholding agent — Applicability of provisions — Retrospective effect of subsequent amendment — Scope. Petitioner University was treated by the tax authorities as a withholding agent and was held responsible for non-deduction and non-deposit of sales tax on taxable supplies made to it during the period July 2012 to June 2013. The order-in-original and subsequent appellate orders invoked S.11(4) of the Act to raise the demand. The Supreme Court observed that S.11(4) deals only with cases of short payment of tax or erroneous refund arising from inadvertence, error, or misconstruction, and does not govern the liability of withholding agents. The liability for failure to deduct or deposit tax by a withholding agent was specifically introduced later through S.11(4A), inserted by the Finance Act, 2016. As the alleged tax periods preceded the introduction of S.11(4A), the said provision could not be applied retrospectively, nor could S.11(4) be stretched to cover withholding liability. (b) Statutory interpretation—Subsequent enactment—Non-retrospective operation. Court reaffirmed that taxing statutes creating new liabilities cannot be applied to past transactions unless the legislature expressly provides retrospective effect. Since the events in question occurred before the enactment of S.11(4A), the petitioner could not be saddled with liability under a provision not in force at the relevant time. The High Court erred in setting aside the Tribunal’s finding that S.11(4) was inapplicable and in sustaining recovery on an impermissible basis. (c) Sales Tax Special Procedure (Withholding) Rules, 2007 ----SRO 660(I)/2007—Rules cannot override the parent statute. Although the department relied on Rules 2 and 3 of the Sales Tax Special Procedure (Withholding) Rules, 2007, the Court held that the rules could not impose a substantive liability absent a corresponding provision in the parent Act. As no statutory authority existed prior to 2016 to hold the petitioner liable as a withholding agent, the recovery proceedings were without lawful basis. Cited Provision and Reference: • Finance Act, 2016 — insertion of S.11(4A) in Sales Tax Act, 1990 Disposition: Petition converted into appeal and allowed—Impugned order of High Court set aside—Order of Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue restored.

Summary: (Against judgment dated 23.10.2024 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in Writ Petition No. 3633-P of 2024). Sales Tax Act ( VII of 1990)--- ----S. 40B---Posting of Inland Revenue Officer---Federal Board of Revenue, powers of---Compliance by dealer/distributor of principal registered person---Scope---Dealer/distributor of principal registered person being aggrieved of a statutory compliance via letter under section 40B of the Sales Tax Act filed a constitutional petition before High Court, which was allowed---Held: Section 40B of the Sales Tax Act, 1990,stipulates that the Federal Board of Revenue may post officer of Inland Revenue to the premises of registered person or class of such persons to monitor production, sales of taxable goods and the stock position---It is not just the production but the sale of taxable goods as well as the stock position which is to be determined through the machinery provided under the Sales Tax Act, 1990---Indeed, the application of section 40B is not limited to the production unit and/or the principal registered person alone; it applies to the premises of registered person or class of such persons to monitor production via sale of such taxable goods and the stock position---Respondent, being a dealer/distributor of principal registered person, falls within the class and the purpose of section 40B is not just the production but it includes sale of taxable goods via dealers/distributors and the stock position---Hence, the reasons extended in the impugned judgment passed by the High Court did not reconcile with the frame of section 40B of the Sales Tax Act, 1990---Supreme Court set aside and the impugned judgment by converting the petition into appeal and allowing the same. Sajeed Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (through video-link from Peshawar). Shahid Qayyum, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents. Date of hearing: 8th October, 2025.

Summary: (a) Sales Tax Act, 1990 ----S. 40B—Posting of Inland Revenue Officer—Scope and applicability—Distributor and dealer of manufacturer—Monitoring production, sale, and stock position—Jurisdiction of Federal Board of Revenue (FBR). Held, under S. 40B of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) is empowered to post officers of Inland Revenue not only at the production premises of manufacturers but also at the premises of any registered person or class of such persons, including distributors and dealers, for monitoring production, sale of taxable goods, and stock position—The statutory provision is broad in scope and not confined solely to manufacturers—Respondent No.1, being a distributor of M/s Star Tobacco Company (Pvt.) Ltd., falls within the purview of such monitoring authority—High Court erred in restricting the applicability of S. 40B to manufacturing premises alone—Impugned judgment held inconsistent with statutory intent and set aside accordingly. (b) Administrative Law— ----Writ jurisdiction—Interference with statutory powers of FBR—Legality. High Court’s interference with lawful exercise of statutory powers under S. 40B of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, held unwarranted—Where statute expressly authorizes the posting of officers to monitor production, sales, and stock at registered premises, judicial restraint is required in administrative oversight matters—Intervention by High Court in such domain constitutes excess of jurisdiction—Impugned judgment set aside. Disposition—Civil Petition converted into appeal and allowed—Judgment of Peshawar High Court dated 17.06.2025 set aside. Approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.115---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 5 & First Sched., Art.162-A---Civil revision---Office objection---Civil revision filed before the High Court was within time but was re-submitted after removing office objection---Civil revision was re-submitted beyond the period allowed by the Office---Limitation---Condonation of delay, seeking of---Sufficient cause---The applicants filed a civil revision challenging a judgment dated 08.05.2025 and obtained a certified copy on 19.05.2025, which was received by them on 17.07.2025---The civil revision was first filed on 08.09.2025, but on 11.09.2025 the office of the Court raised objections and returned the file for removal of those objections---The file was received back by the applicants on 16.09.2025, and the civil revision was ultimately re-filed on 27.09.2025---No explanation was provided for the period between receiving the file with objections and the date of re-filing---Question requiring determination before the High Court was “whether the delay in re-filing the civil revision, after receiving the file back with objections, could be condoned when no explanation was given for the intervening period?”---Held: For the interregnum period no explanation seeking condonation of delay was given, therefore, the delay could not be condoned---Office of the High Court raised certain objections to the civil revision on 11.09.2025 with the stipulation that it was to be re-filed, whereupon, the case file was received by the applicants on 16.09.2025, however, it was re-filed on 27.09.2025, thus, even if it was considered that when the civil revision was filed, it was within time, however, when the office objections were raised and time was given to remove the same, period of limitation started to run against the applicants as and when the file was received by the applicant and since no valid explanation had been given for the interregnum period (when the file was received and re-filed) as it was not the case of the applicants that they were not aware of the office objections or had not received any intimation qua the same, as they received the case file on 16.09.2025, however, they re-filed the same on 27.09.2025, therefore, when the civil revision was re-filed, the period of limitation as contemplated in S.115 C.P.C and Art.162-A of the Limitation Act, 1908 had already elapsed and as no sufficient cause had been given for the interregnum period, hence, the delay in re-filing the civil revision, which was re-filed after the expiry of period of limitation of the civil revision, thus, could not be condoned---Since the application seeking condonation of delay in filing the present revision petition had been dismissed, therefore, present revision petition was also dismissed being barred by time. Asad Ali and 9 others v. The Bank of Punjab and others PLD 2020 SC 736 rel. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.115---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 5 & First Sched., Art.162-A---Civil revision---Limitation---Delay---Previously, t he limitation for filing a civil revision was provided in S.115 of C.P.C (90 days from the date of order, judgment and decree), however, since S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 was not applicable, hence, the delay could not have been condoned, however, in view of an amendment made in First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908 a new Article (Article 162-A) has been inserted, which spells out the period for filing a civil revision, thus, as a natural corollary to that S.5 of the Act has been made applicable to S.115 C.P.C, however, in order to seek refuge of the said provision sufficient cause has to be given by the applicants for seeking condonation of delay. (c) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----S.5---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.115---Civil revision---Office objection---Re-submission of civil revision beyond the period allowed by the Office---Limitation---When office of High Court raises an objection to a petition and gives time for removing the same, if till the expiry of the prescribed period, the objection is not removed or no permission is sought from the Court for extension in the given time, the limitation will start running from the date when the given/prescribed time expires. Chief Executive, PESCO Department, Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar and others v. Afnan Khan and another 2021 SCMR 2100 rel. Saleem Khan v. Mst. Zeenat and others 2023 CLC 1217; Khalid Meer and others v. Faqeerullah Minhaj and others PLD 2018 Lah. 697 and Naheed Ahmad v. Asif Riaz and 3 others PLD 1996 Lah. 702 ref. (d) Limitation--- ----Void order---Even a void order has to be assailed within the period of limitation prescribed under the law. Chief Engineer, Gujranwala Electric Power Company (GEPCO), Gujranwala, v. Khalid Mehmood and others 2023 PLC 65; Muhammad Sharif and others v. MCB Bank Limited and others 2021 SCMR 1158; Abid Hussain v. Secretary Ministry of Defence, Government of Pakistan through Chief of Air Staff, Islamabad 2021 SCMR 645; Haji Wajdad v. Provincial Government through Secretary Board of Revenue, Government of Balochistan, Quetta and others 2020 SCMR 2046; Ghulam Hussain Ramzan Ali v. Collector of Customs (Preventive), Karachi 2015 PTD 107; Ghulam Hussain Ramzan Ali v. Collector of Customs (Preventive), Karachi 2014 SCMR 1594; Gen. (R.) Parvez Musharraf v. Nadeem Ahmed (Advocate) and another PLD 2014 SC 585 and Messrs Blue Star Spinning Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Sales Tax and others 2013 SCMR 587 rel. (e) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----S.5---Condonation of delay---Scope---Each and every day consumed for approaching a court beyond the period of limitation has to be explained. Sadiq Ali v. Government of Punjab and others 2023 PLC (CS) 310; Shahin Shah v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Irrigation Department, Peshawar and others 2022 SCMR 1810; Lal Khan through legal heirs v. Muhammad Yousaf through legal heirs PLD 2011 SC 657; Qaiser Mushtar Ahmad v. Controller of Examination and others PLD 2011 SC 174 and Muhammad Amjad Senior Superintendent of Police (Operations), Lahore and others 2010 PLC (C.S.) 838 rel. Shahid Rafiq Mayo for Petitioners.

Summary: Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----S.122(9), first proviso [as inserted through Finance Act, 2021 and as amended in Finance Act, 2022]---Amendment of assessments order, passing of---Timeframe---Extension granted beyond 90 days---Powers of Commissioner Inland Revenue (CIR)---Scope---Time taken through adjournments by the taxpayer---Effect---Summary given in the very impugned order revealed that extension was granted by CIR beyond 90 days (from 12.09.2023 to 15.12.2023 )---The first proviso of S.122(9) clearly stipulates that extended period granted by CIR shall in no case exceed ninety days---The phrase “such extended period shall in no case exceed ninety days ” clearly reflects the legislature’s force behind it so as to confine the CIR not to extend even a single day beyond ninety days, so, the extension given by the CIR beyond ninety days was patently illegal and unlawful---Moreover, even after excluding the adjournments of 45 days taken by the taxpayer the impugned order was still time barred---Plain language of first proviso to S.122(9) inserted through Finance Act, 2021, as amended in Finance Act, 2022, clearly indicates that the tax officer was bound to pass order within the stipulated time 180 days or within extended time by the CIR which could not exceed ninety days---The intention of legislature by inserting this proviso clearly meant to restrict the officers to pass orders within time so as to curtail the unbridled and unlimited powers of the officers in passing assessment orders whenever they wanted---The curtailing of powers of the officer and CIR and the negative character of language employed in the first proviso pointed towards their mandatory mature---Pertinently, previously there was no time limit and the first proviso in S.122(9) was inserted in Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, by way of amendment through Finance Act, 2021---When the legislature made an amendment in an existing law by providing a specific procedure or time frame for performing a curtain act, such provision could not be interpreted in a way which would render it redundant of nugatory---First proviso to S. 122(9) is mandatory in nature and the non-compliance with its terms would be that any order passed beyond stipulated time period would be invalid---Further, as per second proviso of S. 122(9) time taken through adjournments by the taxpayer not exceeding sixty days shall be excluded from the computation of the period specified in the first proviso---In the present case, the taxpayer took adjournments for 45 days which had been excluded from the above made computation---The assessment order was time barred hence was illegal, void ab-initio and not sustainable under the law---Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue set-aside the impugned order---Appeal, filed by Taxpayer, was allowed, in circumstances. Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala v. Super Asia 2017 SCMR 1427 ref. Ch. Qamar Zaman for Appellant. Imran Saeed, DR for Respondent. Date of hearing: 24th September, 2025.

Summary: (a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)--- ----S.194-C(5)---Difference of opinion between the Members of a Customs Appellate Tribunal / Bench---Mandatory procedure of adjudication---Scope---From reading of S. 194-C(5) of the Customs Act, 1969 (‘the Act’), it is evident that the statutory provision contemplates a specific procedure to be followed in the event of a difference of opinion between the Members of a Bench of Customs Appellate Tribunal (‘Tribunal’)---The legislative intent is unambiguous, the Members shall first formulate the precise point or points of difference, which shall then be referred by the Chairman of the Tribunal to one or more other Members for resolution---The final decision must reflect the opinion of the majority of the Members who have heard the case, including those who originally constituted the Bench---Said framework ensures adjudication in accordance with law and upholds the principle of collective decision-making---However , in the present matter, the Tribunal had failed to adhere to the mandatory procedural requirements set forth under the said provision---The Members of the original Bench did not record or frame the specific point or points on which they differed, as required under S. 194-C(5) of the Act---In absence of duly formulated points of difference, the matter was nonetheless referred by the Chairman to a Referee Member, contrary to the statutory mandate; the Referee Member proceeded to dispose of the matter without identifying or addressing any specific point or points of divergence and without assigning independent or reasoned justification for concurring with either Member of the original Bench---Said lapses amounted to a clear violation of the mandatory procedures prescribed by law---Thus, the impugned judgment was vitiated by procedural illegality and could not be sustained in law---High Court set-a side the impugned judgment passed by the Member (Technical) of the Tribunal, including the orders rendered by the dissenting Member and the Referee Member ; and the matter was remanded to the Chairman of the Appellate Tribunal for a fresh hearing and decision in accordance with law---Special Reference Application was disposed of accordingly. Messrs Vintak Pipe Industries through Proprietor v. Customs Appellate Tribunal and 3 others 2018 PTD 1823 and Deputy Collector Sales Tax v. Collector, Excise and Sales Tax and others 2002 PTD 2570 ref. (b) Customs Act (IV of 1969)--- ----S. 194-C(5)---Difference of opinion between the Members of a Customs Appellate Tribunal / Bench---Mandatory procedure of adjudication---Scope---“Majority opinion”---Scope---Record disclosed three distinct and mutually inconsistent opinions: (i) the original judgment authored by the Member (Technical), (ii) the dissenting note of the Member (Judicial), and (ii) the brief, unreasoned orders of the Referee Member; which, could not collectively constitute a “majority opinion” as contemplated under S. 194-C(5) of the Customs Act (‘the Act’), as the majority must emerge from a procedurally valid formulation of points of difference and their resolution, which was absent in this case---Such a course of action undermined the statutory structure, defeated the legislative intent behind collective adjudication, and constituted a material irregularity going to the root of the proceedings---High Court set-aside the impugned judgment passed by the Member (Technical) of the Tribunal, including the orders rendered by the dissenting Member and the Referee Member ; and the matter was remanded to the Chairman of the Appellate Tribunal for a fresh hearing and decision in accordance with law--- Special Reference Application was disposed of accordingly. Rana Muhammad Mehtab for Applicant-Department. Umar Ilyas Khan for Respondent. Date of hearing: 24th September, 2025. MALIK JAVID IQBAL WAINS, J.--- This judgment shall decide the instant Custom Reference Application along with connected Reference Applications bearing Nos.28738 of 2024, 28739 of 2024, 28741 of 2024, 29457 of 2024, 29458 of 2024, 29459 of 2024, and 29460 of 2024, filed by applicant-department and respondent-taxpayer, as all these matters involve common question of law, though arising from the separate judgments.

Summary: (Against judgment dated 18.03.2021 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Sales Tax Reference No. 13-P of 2011). (a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----S. 66---Refund of claim---Applicability---Period of limitation set out in Section 66 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 applies when there is a claim for refund based on any one of four grounds: inadvertence, error, misconstruction or refund on account of input adjustment not claimed within the relevant tax period. (b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----Ss. 7 & 66---Refund of claim---Relevant tax period---Limitation period---During 13-06-1997 to 05-09-2000 supply of cement was exempted from tax---Respondent / taxpayer claimed refund of tax paid during the period of exemption---Validity---Since the “relevant tax period” did not (and could not) exist in the period of exemption, no date within that period could serve as the starting point of limitation envisaged by section 66 of Sales Tax Act, 1990---End of the period of exemption did not mark the last day for the start of limitation since up to that point in time there was in law no “time period”---If at all any question of limitation could arise under Section 66 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 the date for its starting would (and could only) lie in the successive “time periods” that had become operative after the end of the exemption---For purposes of computing limitation, time did not begin to run from the end of the period of exemption or any other date prior thereto located within that period---Period of exemption ended on 05-09-2000 and application for refund was made by end August/beginning September 2001, which was well within (or at most towards the end of) a period of one year from the end of the exemption---Limitation did not begin to run from 05-09-2000 (or any date prior thereto) but rather (if at all) from the successive time periods after that date; the claim was well within time and could not be defeated or denied on the ground of being time barred---Supreme Court declined to interfere in the matter as High Court and Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue had correctly concluded that respondent / taxpayer was entitled to refund of remaining amount of Rs. 6,439,608/---Appeal was dismissed. Pakistan Beverage Ltd. v. Large Taxpayer Unit 2010 PTD 2673; CPLA 658-K/2010 and others; CRP 4-K/2011 and others; Commissioner Inland Revenue and others v. Arco Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. and others 2021 SCMR 1308; Waseem Ahmed and another v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2014 PTD 1733; C.A. No. 600/2016 and others and PLD 2025 SC 633 rel. Qaiser Abbas Bangash, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (via video-link, Peshawar). Isaac Ali Qazi, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent (via video-link, Peshawar). Date of hearing: 27th May, 2025.