Summary: Hiba biliwaz and Hiba bi-shart-al-iwaz are preemptable. The Hiba with a condition for something inreturn is called as Hiba-ba-shartul-iwaz. In this kind of hiba, the donee does not pay the consideration voluntarily, it is paid by the donee because it is a condition precedent for the gift. In other words, the gift and the iwaz go hand in hand not one before the other. Payment of consideration is a prior condition (shart) for the gift. Therefore, subsequent gift by donee to donor is the condition precedent for the first gift in favour of the donee. The subsequent gift by donee to donor is not consideration of the first gift. The result is that in a Hibaba- shartul-iwaz the original gift is a pure gift at its inception and the payment of Iwaz is also an independent gift. Accordingly, Hiba-ba-shartul-iwaz is nothing but aset of two independent gifts in which the second gift is condition precedent for the first. Any kind of property may be stipulated as return.The legal incidents of a Hiba-bashartul-iwaz are given below:(1) As the whole transaction is a set of two independent gifts, therefore, it must be completed by declaration, acceptance and delivery of possession. Registration is neither necessary nor sufficient for any of the two gifts.(2) It is revocable in the beginning (i.e. when only the original gift has been made by donor to donee). But, as soon as the donee makes the gift of his property in furtherance of fulfilment of condition, the transaction becomes irrevocable.(3) Since Hiba-ba-shartul-iwaz is legally a set of two independent gifts, therefore, the right of pre-emption is exercisable in it. There is a slightest difference between hibabiliwaz and Hiba basharat-ul-iwaz such as:i. In Hiba- bill-iwaz, the consideration is paid by donee voluntarily, whereas in Hiba-ba-Shartul-iwaz, itspayment is a condition precedent.ii. In Hiba- bil-iwaz the consideration is at the will of donee but in Hiba-ba-shartul- iwaz the value andkinds of consideration is at the discretion of the donor.iii. Hiba- bil-Iwaz is not a Hiba; it is either sale or exchange whereas Hiba-ba-shartul-iwaz is treated asHiba.iv. Doctrine of Musha is not applicable to Hiba- billiwaz whereas this doctrine is applicable to Hiba-bashartul- Iwaz.v. Since Hiba- bil-iwaz is not gift, it is either sale or exchange, therefore it must be in writing andregistered, whereas in Hiba-ba-Shartul-iwaz writing and registration is neither necessary nor sufficient.vi. In Hiba- bil-Iwaz, the delivery of possession is not necessary whereas it is necessary in Hiba-ba-Shartul-iwaz.vii. The Hiba-bil-Iwaz becomes irrevocable as soon as made, whereas Hiba-ba-Shaatul-iwaz is revocable and becomes irrevocable only after the payment of iwaz by the donee.

Summary: It appears from the record that the first talab, i.e, talab-i-muwathibat, as alleged by the petitioners, to have been made by them in presence of the inhabitants of locality including Muhammad Iqbal son of petitioner No.1 when informer, namely, Akhtar Munir, allegedly told them about sale, but the intriguing aspect of the matter in hand is that neither the informer nor anyone else in whose presence talab-i-muwathibat was allegedly made was produced. It was not the petitioners case that only the petitioners, Iqbal and Akhtar Munir, were present when first talab was made but the plaint reveals that Petitioner No.1 after performing Hajj arrived to home where his friends and relatives were also assembled for Mubarakbadi of hajj, when the talab was allegedly made by them, so, in such circumstances, the factum of first talab could easily be proved by production of any one from the said witnesses in whose presence the talabs was made. Copies of notices reveal no separate notice was given to the vendees, similarly, notices allegedly sent to the respondents were not under the cover of registered acknowledgment due, for which the statement of PW 3 was of worth perusal, who in his cross examination deposed that both of the receipts No 535 and 536 were of simple registered post as none of the registered post was under the cover of acknowledgment due. It is pertinent to mention here that in the written statement, it was categorically denied that no notice was given to respondents No.2, despite the fact that the petitioners have not produced postman, which was one of the legal requirements of pre-emption. In such circumstances, when receipt of notices was denied, production of postman as petitioners witness was sine qua non.

Summary: In order to prove superior right, petitioner produced patwari halqa, who placed on file an extract from record of right/fard-jamabandi for the year 2011-12 of property bearing Khasra No.1706 (ExPW1/1), Khasra Nos. 1707, 1708, 1705, 1709 and 1710 (EXPW1/7, EXPW1/4), all these khasra numbers pertaining to Shamilat Akazai though by placing on file, petitioner wanted to prove that he is contiguous owner of the disputed property, however, as the list of proprietary body Fihrist-i-Malikan was not placed on file, which could determine the status of petitioner as to whether he is original owner(Asal malik) or Malik-e-Qabza, because mere placing on record the extract from jamabandi could not ipso facto be a conclusive proof of his ownership in the shamilat thus ExPW1/1, ExPW1/4 and EXPW1/7 are not helpful for petitioner. Likewise, aks shajra kishtwar ExPW1/2, without proof that in which khasra, petitioner was the owner has also not contributed any premium to him. Moreover, petitioner by placing on record ExPW5/4 (Iqrar Nama) dated 25.06.2000, (Iqrar Nama) dated 06.12.1997 ExPW5/5 and (Iqrar Nama) dated 02.03.2002 ExPW5/6 contended that vide ExPW 5/4 and ExPW5/6, he has become owner in property which is contiguous to the disputed property,however, neither marginal witness nor the vendors were produced to corroborate his version. There is solitary statement of petitioner, in which these documents were placed on record, which were objected by the respondent, so in the circumstances; petitioner was required to establish the case through wellfounded and credible evidence, which is lacking in his case. So, from nowhere petitioner could prove his preferential right of pre-emption.

Summary: The petitioner has filed a revision petition under Section 115 CPC against the judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge, Kahror Pakka. The petitioner had filed a suit for possession through the right of pre-emption, claiming that he had a superior right to purchase a piece of land sold to the respondent. The trial court and the appellate court both dismissed the suit, and the petitioner seeks revision of this decision. The court examined the case and notes that the petitioner failed to establish Talb-i-Muwathibat, which is foundational for the right of pre-emption. It also highlighted discrepancies in the evidence provided by the petitioner's witnesses. Additionally, the court emphasized the mandatory nature of Talbs and the need for strict adherence to the procedural requirements. Regarding Talb-i-Ishhad, the court finds deficiencies in the notice sent by the petitioner, including its undated nature and lack of proper witnesses. The petitioner failed to produce the acknowledgment due card and the postman who delivered the notice. Ultimately, the court dismissed the revision petition, stating that there is no merit in the petitioner's arguments, and it is dismissed in limine.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)- -S.152-Correction of error-Object, scope and purpose-Scope of S.152, C.P.C. is very limited as only clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments decrees or orders, or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission, may be corrected by Court either on its own motion or on application by any of the parties-Instead of challenging a judgment, decree or order by availing remedy provided by law within prescribed period of limitation, parties should be allowed at any stage, at their own will and convenience, to invoke S.152, C.P.C. to reopen a matter that had attained finality. Haji Ishtiaq Ahmed and 2 others v. Bakhhaya and 7 others 1976 SCMR 420; Baqar v. Muhammad Rafique and others 2003 SCMR 1401 and Koka Adinarayana Rao Naidu v. Koka Kothandaramayya Naidu and others AIR 1940 Madras 538 rel. (b) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)- -Ss. 28-A [as omitted by Land Acquisition (Sindh Amendment) Act, 2009 (XVI of 2010)] & 34-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 152-Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972), S. 3-Intra Court Appeal-Correction of judgment and decree-Error, nature of-Accidental slip and error-Dispute was with regard to exercise of jurisdiction under S.52, C.P.C. for enhancing compensation awarded by Referee Court regarding land acquired-Validity-Respondents-land owners did not allege that there was any arithmetical mistake in judgment-Sole ground of respondents-land owners was that due to an 'accidental slip and error' in judgment, benefits of Ss.28-A & 34 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, were not extended to them-Non-grant of benefits under Ss.28-A & 34 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, to respondents-land owners in judgment by Judge in Chambers of High Court did not fall within the scope of accidental slip and or omission contemplated in S.152, C.P.C. nor could the same be deemed as such under any circumstances-Scope and or nature of relief once granted in any judgment, decree or order could not be enlarged reduced, reversed, reviewed, changed, modified or altered subsequently by Court under S.152, C.P.C. nor could any such relief be granted by Court under S.152 C.P.C. that was not prayed for-Provisions of S.28-A of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was repealed / omitted with retrospective effect vide Land Acquisition (Sindh Amendment) Act, 2009-Claim of respondents-land owners under Ss.28-A & 34 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was not maintainable before Judge in Chambers of High Court in their disposed reference-Respondents-land owners could avail their remedy before Executing Court in which case Executing Court would examine and decide their claim strictly in accordance with law-Division Bench of High Court set aside order passed by Judge in Chambers of High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under S. 152, C.P.C.-Intra Court Appeal was allowed accordingly. Ch. Ahmed Nawaz v. Province of Punjab through Land Acquisition Collector, Jhelum and others 2015 SCMR 823; Sarup Singh v. Union of India AIR 2011 SC 514; Messrs Rabia Rana and Company through Managing Partner v. Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary and 4 others 2016 YLR 2286; Ghulam Muhammad v. Government of West Pakistan, PLD 1967 SC 191; Syed Saadi Jafri Zainabi v. Land Acquisition Collector and Assistant Commissioner PLD 1992 SC 472; Government of Sindh and 2 others v. Syed Shakir Ali Jafri and 6 others 1996 SCMR 1361; Dilawar Hussain and 6 others v. Province of Sindh through Secretary, Revenue Department, Karachi and 2 others PLD 2003 Kar. 174 and Dilawar Hussain and others v. Province of Sindh and others PLD 2016 SC 514 ref. Dates of hearing: 26th October, 6th November, 19th December, 2018, 26th April, 3rd May, 2019 and 2nd March, 2020.