Summary: Arbitration Act (X of 1940)--- ----S.14---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched., Arts.178 & 181---Arbitral award---Filing before the court---Limitation---Filing of award by arbitrator himself---Effect---Objection that filing was barred by limitation---Legality---Distinction from party-initiated filing---Scope---Briefly, the petitioner and the respondent entered into a contract for supply and installation of DG sets at PTCL sites---Contract contained an arbitration clause nominating the CEO of PTCL as arbitrator---An arbitral award was made in favor of the respondent and was initially filed before the civil court but was returned for want of pecuniary jurisdiction, after which the arbitrator himself filed the award before the district court---Petitioner objected that the filing was barred by limitation under Article 178 of the Limitation Act, 1908---Objection was accepted by the district court but set aside by the High Court, leading to the present petition before the Supreme Court requiring determination of the issue as to “whether Article 178 of the Limitation Act, 1908, applied where the award was filed by the arbitrator himself without a party applying to the court, or whether such filing was governed by the residuary Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908?”---Held: Article 178 of the Act of 1908 being the primary provision regulated the period within which proceedings could be instituted for making an Award Rule of the Court---It prescribed a period of ninety days, running from the date on which notice of the making of the Award was served---Where a party did not first request the arbitrator or umpire to file the Award in Court, it could directly approach the Court and seek an order directing the Arbitrator or umpire to file the Award or a signed copy thereof---An application of this nature fell within the ambit of Article 178 of the Act of 1908,provided that notice of the Award had been served in terms of Section 14(1) of the Act of 1940---A different legal regime applied where no notice of the Award had been served and the party merely requested the Arbitrator, under Section 14(2) of the Act of 1940, to file the Award in Court---In such a situation, the residuary Article 181 of the Act of 1908 applied---Article 181 prescribed a period of three years commencing from the date when the right to apply accrued---In matters of arbitration, that right accrued when the Award is made and the party obtained knowledge of it---Article 178 of the Act of 1908 has no application where the Award was filed by the Arbitrator himself because he sought no relief for his own benefit---Service of notice upon the party is, therefore, a sine qua non for the applicability of Article 178 of the Act of 1908, and in the absence of such notice, the provision could not be invoked---In the present case, the record clearly demonstrated that the respondent did not, at any material stage, file an application under Section 14(2) of the Act of 1940 seeking a direction from the Court requiring the Arbitrator to file the Award---Instead, it was the Arbitrator who filed the Award before the district court, without any judicial direction compelling him to do so---In such circumstances, the essential preconditions for the applicability of Article 178 of the Act of1908 were not met, and the provision was erroneously invoked---High Court rightly held that Article 178 of the Act of 1908 applied only where a party to the arbitration proceedings applied to the Court for filing of the Award---It did not apply to an application made by the party to the Arbitrator for filing the Award, which would instead been governed by Article 181 of the Act of 1908---Leave was declined and present petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Qaiser Imam, Advocate Supreme Court along with Tariq Aziz, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner. Muhammad Ali Raza, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent (via VL from Lahore). Date of hearing: 23rd September, 2025.

Summary: Rule 9-A of the Rules and Orders of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, Volume-V, Chapter-1, applies only when a party fails to collect the case file after objections are raised. If the file is received by the party, no action under Rule 9-A is needed. Otherwise, the office must post objections and place the matter before a Judge after seven days. 2. Ingredients of Hiba are not fulfilled. 3. By not entering the witness box and giving no sufficient cause, the applicant invited an adverse inference under Article 129(g) QSO, 1984, despite relying on the gift mutation through his attorney. 147Civil Revision 13153/22 Muhammad Irfan Butt etc Vs Aliya Nawaz Butt Mr. Justice Muzamil Akhtar Shabir 12- 11- 2025 2025 LHC 7363

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Section 2(a) of the Act, 1991 in so far as it excludes from the definition of immovable property, all properties situated in an urban area or within cantonment limits was declared repugnant to the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and sunnah of Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) w.e.f 31st December, 1993. Needless to reiterate that in terms of Article 189 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, any decision of the Supreme Court shall, to the extent that it decides a question of law or is based upon or enunciates a principle of law, be binding on all other Court in Pakistan. 150RSA- Specific Performance 34-17 GHULAM MUSTAFA VS SAMINA AMJAD Mr. Justice Anwaar Hussain 11- 11- 2025 2025 LHC 7000

Summary: The respondent by getting her conceding statement recorded in the petition to obtain succession certificate in favour of petitioner No.1 has not conceded her right to obtain her share in inheritance in property left by her father. 148Misc. Writ 34478/25 Riasat Ali & 1 Other Vs Muhammad Sharif etc Mr. Justice Malik Waqar Haider Awan 12- 11- 2025 2025 LHC 6626

Summary: ----Ss.9 &10---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.4---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.12---Specific performance decree---Conditional decree requiring deposit of balance sale consideration within “two months”---Deposit in bank/treasury---Treasury/bank refusing to accept deposit during court hours---Legality---Treasury/bank deemed closed for that day---Scope---Act may be done on the next opening day---Default clause (deemed dismissal/forfeiture) attracted only upon expiry of lawful computation of the deposit period---Where the day falls on closed/non-banking days, performance shifts to the next working day---Deposit to be treated within time---Facts:---On 03.09.2018, respondent No.1’s suit for specific performance was decreed by the appellate court, subject to deposit of the balance sale consideration of Rs. 35,19,000/- within two months, failing which the suit would stand dismissed and earnest money forfeited; respondent No.1 deposited the amount on 05.11.2018, the executing court upheld an objection and treated the deposit as delayed by four days, but appeal was allowed, hence, the present revision petition. Issue: “Whether the deposit made on 05.11.2018 was within the time stipulated in the decree (after excluding the day of decree and accounting for closed/ non-banking days), or whether the executing court had become functus officio and the decree stood dismissed for non-deposit within time?”---Held: The term month employed in contracts denoted a period terminating with the day of succeeding month numerically, corresponding to the day of its beginning, less one---Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provided that it would be sufficient for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word ‘from’, and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word ‘to’---The Limitation Act, 1908 also permitted that for the purpose of instituting appeal or application, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced was to be excluded---Thus, in the present case the day of decree i.e. 03.09.2018 was required to be excluded---Date 03.11.2018 was Saturday and 04.11.2018 was Sunday---BPRD Circular No. 08 of 2018 dated 16.05.2018issued by the State Bank of Pakistan was also produced, which reflected working days for deposit in the concerned bank account were from Monday to Friday---View adopted by the appellate court was correct and justified---Court became functus officio only once the period allowed for deposit was over---Present civil revision petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Messrs Tribal Friends Co. v. Province of Balochistan 2002 SCMR 1903; Messrs Malik Muhammad Nawaz, Haji Aziz Ahmad Commission Agents, Chakwal v. Syed Mehmood Hussain 1997 SCMR 264 and Muhammad Yousuf and 3 others v. Zafarullah and another 1992 SCMR 117 rel. Sher Muhammad and 6 others v. Gul Fraz 1989 CLC 1344 and Nijabat Khan v. Nur Ahmad and 7 others PLD 1957 (W.P.) Lah. 92 ref. (b) General Clauses Act (X of 1897)--- ----S.10---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.4---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.12---Specific performance decree---Court ordering deposit of decretal amount within two months---Refusal by treasury/bank to accept deposit during court hours---Effect---Treasury/bank deemed “closed” for the day---Benefit to depositor---Next-day deposit, validity of---Scope---Rationale---As per S.10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 if Court or office is closed on the day when an act is to be performed, the act can be performed on the next opening day of the Court or office---Section 4 of the Limitation Act provides that where period of limitation expires on a day when the Court is closed, suit or appeal or application may be preferred on the day the Court reopens. Nijabat Khan v. Nur Ahmad and 7 others PLD 1957 (W.P.) Lah. 92 ref. Javed Anwar Janjua for Petitioner. Malik M. Arshad Kundi for Respondent No. 1. Date of hearing: 28th October, 2025.

Summary: Scope of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 153Crl. Appeal- Against Conviction- PPC 434-25 SAJID HUSSAIN VS STATE ETC Mr. Justice Sadiq Mahmud Khurram 10- 11- 2025 2025 LHC 8298

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----Ss.153, 236G & 236H---Tax, collection of---Withholding tax agents (wholesalers, distributors and retailers)---Constitutionality of enactment---Legislature, powers of---Contention of the petitioners (wholesalers and distributors) was that S. 236H was the repetition of Ss. 153 and 236G of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Validity---It is oozing from the bare perusal of the S.236-H that tax palpably is collectible from retailers, while the petitioners are distributors/wholesalers, thus, the wholesalers and distributors merely act as withholding tax agents when they make sales to retailers, consequent of which burden of advance tax collected under section 236-H rests upon retailers---Although all Ss. (153, 236G and 236H) relate to withholding and advance taxes, but they cover different types of transactions and have different applicability---Section 236G is related to the advance tax on sales made to distributors, dealers and wholesalers and S. 236H deals with the advance tax on sales to retailers---The whole idea behind the scheme was build up a database of unregistered persons and then use this information for broadening of tax base---Section 153 is a tax on payments for goods and services, while Ss. 236G and 236H are taxes on sales of specific goods---Pertinently, all the withholding taxes/advance taxes (sections 148 to 156 and Ss. 231 to 236) under Income Tax Ordinance are being withheld/collected through the persons other than Inland Revenue Department since decades, thus, the distributors/wholesalers are not the sole withholding tax agents---Tax under S. 236 is a tax on income of a retailer and the same cannot be shifted to consumers---Tax collectable under Ss. 153, 236G and 236H is to be borne by suppliers, distributors and retailers respectively against the income separately---The tax chargeable under S. 236H is nominal which merely serves to document the economy in view of contribution in GDP i.e. 18%---Presumption is always there in favour of the constitutionality of enactment in case of challenge being made to it, however, another principle qua presumption regarding judging the statute is that there should have been no classification at all (excepting reasonable classification)---No eventuality arose from the case to take contra presumption---In case of revenue relating laws, if they are questioned and attacked and equal possible interpretations can be possible one favouring the revenue is to be adopted---Petitioner had failed to point out any illegality or irregularity on the part of the respondents---Writ can be issued where any violation of law and rules is pointed out but no such eventuality has been found in the present case---Petitioners failed to make out their case for interference---Writ petition was dismissed. 2000 PTD 2959 ref. (b) Tax--- ----Imposition of---Legislature of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, powers of---It is the prerogative of the Legislature to impose tax under the Interim Constitution of Azad Jammu and Kashmir---It is the domain of the Legislature to impose taxes for the purpose of generation of revenues required to defray the cost of governance; subject to the roadmap of the Constitution---Modus operandi of tax deduction is prerogative of the Legislature to device the mechanism for the collection of taxes. Sardar Tahir Anwar for Petitioners. Mrs. Bilqees Rasheed Minhas for Respondents.

Summary: The choice to initiate and pursue one out of host of available concurrent or co-existent proceedings/actions or remedy from a forum of competent jurisdiction vested with that party but when once choice was exercised and election was made then such party is precluded from launching another proceeding to seek a relief or remedy contrary to what would be claimed and or achieved by adopting other proceeding/action and or remedy, which in legal parlance is recognized as "doctrine of election". 156Writ Petition- Family- Maintenance 7940-19 TANVEER AHMED VS ADJ ETC Mr. Justice Anwaar Hussain 06- 11- 2025 2025 LHC 6632