Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----S. 302(b)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 382-B & 544-A---Murder---Reappraisal of evidence---FIR and ocular account rendered doubtful---Benefit of doubt---The appellant was charged with murder by inflicting brick blows on the deceased within a village mosque---Trial Court convicted him under S.302(b), PPC, and sentenced him to death, which the High Court maintained by converting it to life imprisonment---During leave proceedings, the Supreme Court noted discrepancies in the recording and registration of the FIR, particularly the complainant’s admission of consulting a relative for drafting a written complaint before approaching the police, and the I.O.’s contradictory account that the FIR was recorded on an already-prepared application---Absence of the original statement of the complainant and conflicting versions of the I.O. rendered the very initiation of proceedings doubtful---Held, the FIR was not registered in the manner prescribed by law and was tainted with suspicion. (b) Criminal trial---Ocular account---Witness credibility---Unnatural conduct---Absence of independent witnesses---Benefit of doubt---The ocular version given by the complainant and another witness was found improbable: they allowed the accused to take the deceased away despite an earlier quarrel, did not intervene during the assault, failed to apprehend the accused, and their statements about entering the mosque through a window or gate were inconsistent---No independent witness, including the Imam or neighbours, was joined despite their availability---Held, the conduct of witnesses was unnatural, their presence doubtful, and their testimony untrustworthy---Reliance placed on *Pathan v. The State* (2015 SCMR 315), *Zafar v. The State* (2018 SCMR 326), and *Liaqat Ali v. The State* (2009 SCMR 95). (c) Criminal trial---Recovery of weapon and blood-stained material---Contradictions---Non-exclusive possession---Benefit of doubt---The prosecution alleged recovery of blood-stained bricks at the instance of the accused on 23-02-2010, whereas the Moharrir testified that such bricks were handed over to him on 18-02-2010, i.e., before the alleged recovery---Both the I.O. and Moharrir gave conflicting statements regarding the timing and manner of recovery---The brick and brickbat were allegedly recovered from the mosque, an open and public place accessible to all, and hence not from the exclusive possession of the accused---Absence of independent witnesses in recovery proceedings further reduced evidentiary value---Held, recoveries were fabricated and inconsequential. (d) Criminal trial---Motive---Failure to prove---Effect---The alleged motive of a prior quarrel two days before the occurrence was not established through independent corroboration---Where ocular account itself is doubtful, failure to prove motive further weakens prosecution case---Held, prosecution failed to establish motive beyond reasonable doubt. (e) Administration of justice---Benefit of doubt---Principles---When material contradictions, doubtful recoveries, untrustworthy ocular account, and defective investigation exist, conviction cannot be sustained---Prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and cannot rely on weaknesses of defence---Benefit of every reasonable doubt must go to the accused---Relied upon *Muhammad Hassan v. The State* (2024 SCMR 1427); *Abdul Samad v. The State* (2025 SCP 31); *Tariq Parvez v. The State* (1995 SCMR 1345); *Muhammad Akram v. The State* (2009 SCMR 230); and *Muhammad Imran v. The State* (2020 SCMR 857). (g) Disposition --- Appeal allowed; judgments of Trial Court and High Court set aside; appellant acquitted by extending benefit of doubt and ordered to be released forthwith if not required in any other case. Connected criminal petition by complainant dismissed as infructuous owing to the acquittal of the appellant.

Summary: (a) Customs Act, 1969 ----S. 194C (as amended by the Finance Act, 2024)---Appellate Tribunal—Jurisdiction of Single Member Bench—Effect of omission of sub-section (3A) and substitution of sub-section (2)—Scope and legislative intent—After the Finance Act, 2024, the omission of sub-section (3A) and restructuring of sub-section (2) of S.194C do not extinguish the concept of Single Member Benches—Sub-section (1) continues to empower the Chairman to constitute Benches, and the amended sub-section (2) merely regulates the procedure, case management, and ancillary matters—The mandatory requirement under amended sub-section (3) applies only where the amount of duty, tax, penalty, or fine exceeds five million rupees—Therefore, appeals below that pecuniary threshold may lawfully be heard by a Single Member Bench. (b) Customs Act, 1969 ----S. 194C(4)---Statutory interpretation—Meaning of “authorized” and “constituted”—Scope and independence of sub-section (4)—Sub-section (4) operates as an independent enabling provision empowering the Chairman or an authorized Member of the Appellate Tribunal to sit singly and dispose of any case within the prescribed pecuniary limit—Its operation is not contingent upon the prior constitution of a two-Member Bench, nor is it dependent upon the framing of rules under sub-section (2)—The retention of S.194C(4) post-amendment manifests legislative intent to preserve the jurisdiction of Single Benches. (c) Interpretation of statutes ----Withdrawal or curtailment of jurisdiction—When presumed—Omission of a provision does not by itself imply extinguishment of an existing jurisdiction—Legislative intent to withdraw a conferred jurisdiction must be expressed in clear words or arise by necessary implication—The principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius is inapplicable where the legislative scheme expressly preserves a concurrent provision (such as S.194C(4))—Hence, Single Bench jurisdiction stands retained. (d) Customs Act, 1969 ----S. 194C---Special Benches—Scope of mandatory composition—Only matters exceeding the pecuniary limit of Rs. 5 million must be heard by a Bench of not less than two Members, including one Judicial and one Technical Member—Matters below the said threshold may be lawfully heard and decided by a Single Member Bench under S.194C(4). (g) Disposition— Preliminary question of law answered in the affirmative—Orders passed by Single Member of the Customs Appellate Tribunal held valid and within jurisdiction—Single Benches remain competent to adjudicate cases falling within the pecuniary limits prescribed by S.194C of the Customs Act, 1969—Matters fixed for hearing on merits on 14.10.2025.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----S. 302(b), 302(c), 324, 338-A(b), 337-D & 34—Qatl-i-amd, qatl-i-shibh-i-amd, attempt to murder, causing hurt—Grave and sudden provocation—Conversion of conviction from S.302(b) to S.302(c)—Scope—Evidence and circumstances disclosed that quarrel erupted within domestic premises between deceased (daughter-in-law) and appellant’s mother; both sides exchanged abuses and physical assault—Appellant arrived on call from his mother, who alleged that she was being beaten and insulted—Altercation escalated and appellant fired without premeditation—Prosecution itself admitted prior scuffle and abuse between deceased and mother-in-law—No evidence of prior enmity or motive—Incident occurred in heat of passion upon grave and sudden provocation arising from disrespect and assault to appellant’s mother—No material to show calculated intent to kill—Held, case fell within ambit of S.302(c) PPC—Conviction altered from death under S.302(b) to R.I. for 14 years under S.302(c); other convictions under Ss.324, 338-A(b) & 337-D PPC maintained—Murder Reference answered in Negative; death sentence not confirmed. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----Ss. 302(b), 34—Qatl-i-amd—Common intention—Acquittal of co-accused—Benefit of doubt—No overt act of Mst. Ghafooran Bibi proved regarding firearm injury causing death—Alleged blunt injuries on deceased not shown under which provision they were punishable—No evidence that she shared common intention with principal offender—Held, conviction unsustainable—Accused acquitted. (c) Evidence—Appreciation—Medical corroboration—Post-mortem revealed one firearm injury and remaining abrasions from blunt means; consistent with scuffle and sudden quarrel—Prosecution witnesses admitted altercation sequence and mutual aggression—Such testimony supported plea of provocation rather than premeditated intent. (d) Criminal Law—Appeal against acquittal—Interference—Principles—Unless finding is perverse, wholly illegal, or based on misreading of evidence, acquittal cannot be reversed—Acquitted person enjoys double presumption of innocence—Prosecution failed to produce independent incriminating evidence—Held, acquittal of co-accused Adil Rehman Shakir upheld. (Muhammad Mansha Kausar v. Muhammad Ashgar 2003 SCMR 477—followed) (e) Disposition— ----Murder Reference No. 170 of 2022 answered in Negative; death sentence of Muhammad Nouman Shakir not confirmed—Conviction altered to S. 302(c) PPC; sentenced to 14 years’ R.I.—Crl. Appeal No. 39518-J of 2022 partly allowed; appellant Mst. Ghafooran Bibi acquitted; her bail sureties discharged—Crl. Appeal No. 35023 of 2022 (complainant against acquittal of Adil Rehman Shakir) dismissed.

Summary: (a) Federal Board of Revenue—Creation of field formations and administrative architecture ----Federal Board of Revenue Act, 2007, Ss. 3 & 4(1)(r) FBR is a statutory body empowered to create field formations for efficient implementation of fiscal laws and to assign appropriate titles (RTOs/LTOs). Establishment of LTOs and allocation of functions on territorial/functional bases fall within this mandate. (b) Income-tax authorities—Conferment and transfer of jurisdiction ----Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, Ss. 207 & 209(1), 209(8A) The Ordinance sets a hierarchical structure of income-tax authorities and expressly authorizes the Board or its delegate to transfer jurisdiction from one authority to another. The expression “transfer of jurisdiction” in S. 209(8A) must be read purposively to facilitate responsive and specialized tax administration; consent of the taxpayer or rigid territorial limits are not prerequisites for a lawful transfer. (c) Validity of jurisdictional reallocation from RTO Faisalabad to LTO Multan ----Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, S. 209(8A); FBR Act, 2007, S. 4(1)(r) Order dated 12.10.2020 transferring appellants’ cases to LTO Multan is backed by express statutory authority and aligns with the objective of efficient oversight of large taxpayers. Contemporaneous jurisdiction orders allocating classes of taxpayers to LTOs reflect a consistent and lawful administrative practice under S. 209. (d) Administrative inconvenience, due process and natural justice ----Administrative law principles Logistical inconvenience, increased cost, or need to submit documents at a different office do not vitiate an otherwise lawful exercise of statutory power. No arbitrariness or breach of procedural safeguards was shown; hence, no ground for judicial interference existed. (e) Policy rationale—Large Taxpayer Offices and sectoral clustering ----Tax Administration Reform Project (TARP) (context) Creation/expansion of LTOs and sector-specific clustering (e.g., sugar industry at LTO Lahore) are consistent with statutory purposes of specialization, uniformity and efficiency across geographical boundaries; they do not render the transfer ultra vires. (f) Precedent relied upon by appellants—Distinguished ----Messrs Haq Bahu Sugar Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation (2016 PTD 955) Cited authority does not negate the Board’s express power under S. 209(8A); the challenge premised on absence of transfer power is untenable given the clear statutory text. (g) Disposition — All intra-court appeals, including I.C.A. No. 4404 of 2021 and the connected matters (Annexure-A), dismissed. Judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 21.12.2020 upholding the jurisdictional order is maintained.

Summary: (Against judgment dated 15.08.2025 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in Crl. Misc. B.A. No. 2423-P of 2025). (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497(2)---Prevention of Smuggling of Migrants Act (XVIII of 2018), Ss. 3 & 6---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.185(3)---Receiving money, etc. for providing foreign employment, smuggling of migrants---Bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Allegations against the accused/petitioner was that he was involved in the offence for receiving money for providing foreign employment---Petitioner was alleged to have been involved in the commission of the offence under the Act of 2018---Prosecution's case was that the petitioner was nominated in the crime report pursuant to the information received by the Federal Investigation Authority---Allegedly, the premises from which passports and other incriminating documents were taken into possession were owned by the petitioner---Deputy Attorney General, who was present along with the Investigating Officer, was not able to show that sufficient incriminating material had been collected in order to connect the petitioner with the alleged offences---At this stage, prima facie, a case for further inquiry was made out because the question whether the offences alleged to have been committed were attracted to the extent of the petitioner required further probe---Investigation to the extent of the petitioner had been concluded and his further incarceration would not serve any useful purpose---Petition was converted into an appeal and the same was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.185(3)---Bail order---Observations of the Court---Scope---Observations made in the bail orders are tentative in nature and shall not, in any manner, prejudice the trial proceedings. Arshad Hussain Yousafzai, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner. Raja Shafqat Abbasi, DAG along with Umar Saeed, S.I. for the State. Date of hearing: 12th September, 2025.

Summary: (On appeal against the order/judgment dated 16.11.2022 passed by the Peshawar High Court, D.I.Khan Bench in Civil Revision No. 147-D of 2017). (a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act (X of 1987)--- ----Ss. 2(d), 5 & 13---Pre-emption---Distinction between sale and exchange---Transaction recorded in mutation as an exchange or a sale, classification of---Determination---Right of pre-emption, arising of---Pre-requisite---Occurrence of sale transaction being mandatory---Courts below concurrently holding that defendant failed to prove that the transaction was an exchange---Legality---Burden of proof--- Onus of proof primarily lay with the plaintiff who asserted that mutation represented a sale rather than an exchange---The dispute arose over a parcel of land measuring 24 kanals and 3 marlas situated in Dera Ismail Khan, where “MT”, the owner, executed a mutation reflecting an exchange of land with the defendant, allegedly for better management---The plaintiff, claiming a superior right of pre-emption, instituted a suit asserting that the transaction, though recorded as an exchange, was in fact a sale---Trial Court treated the mutation as a sale and decreed that both parties, being co-owners in the same khata, were entitled to equal pre-emption rights---The appellate and revisional courts upheld this view---The legal issue requiring determination before the Supreme Court was “whether the transaction through mutation constituted a genuine exchange or a sale disguised as an exchange, thereby determining the applicability of the right of pre-emption under Section 5 of the KPK Pre-emption Act, 1987”?---Held: Courts below incorrectly surmised that the defendant failed to provide sufficient proof that the transaction was an exchange---The onus of proof primarily lay with the plaintiff (pre-emptor), who asserted that the recorded mutation represented a sale rather than an exchange---The mere failure of the defendant to establish the transaction as a legitimate and bona fide exchange did not automatically validate the conclusion that it was a sale---The absence of any credible proof indicating payment of price or a promise thereof led to the conclusion that the transaction documented in the mutation was an exchange rather than the sale claimed by the plaintiff (pre-emptor)---Courts below significantly misinterpreted the evidence presented and they also misapplied the relevant legal principles---According to Section 5 of the Act, the right of pre-emption was contingent upon the occurrence of a sale; this right did not extend to transactions such as gifts or exchanges---In the present case, the plaintiff (pre-emptor) failed to demonstrate that the transaction documented in mutation constituted a sale---Consequently, the plaintiff (pre-emptor) was not entitled to the decree he sought---Judgments and decrees issued by the courts below were legally untenable and same were set aside---Petitions were converted into appeals and petition brought forth by the plaintiff (pre-emptor) was dismissed and one brought forth by the defendant was allowed. Elahi Bakhsh through Legal Heirs and others v. Muhammad Iqbal and another 2014 SCMR 1217 rel. (b) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act (X of 1987)--- ----Ss. 2(d) & 5---Pre-emption---Distinction between sale and exchange---Relevance---Transaction recorded in mutation as an exchange or a sale, classification of---Determination---According to Section 5 of the Act, a right of pre-emption arises in the case of a sale, which, as defined in Section 2(d) of the Act, refers to a permanent transfer of ownership of immovable property in exchange for valuable consideration---However, this definition explicitly excludes situations where agricultural lands are exchanged for purposes of better management---While the law of pre-emption can be evaded through lawful means, there is nothing inherently illegal about executing an exchange when a vendee or buyer fears that a straightforward sale in his favour might be pre-empted. (c) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act (X of 1987)--- ----Ss.5 & 13---Pre-emption, right of---Essence, significance and effect---Pre-emptor to prove that transaction is indeed a sale transaction, obligation of---The right of pre-emption serves as a significant constraint on an owner's ability to transfer his property to whomever he likes---This right acts as a clog on the owner’s freedom to alienate his property; it has therefore to be strictly construed---In a pre-emption suit, the plaintiff must not only establish that he has a preferential or superior right over the buyer (vendee) involved in the transaction, but he also bears the burden of proof to demonstrate clearly and convincingly that the transaction he seeks to pre-empt is indeed a sale, and that he has made the necessary demands for pre-emption according to law---If there exists any ambiguity surrounding the nature of the transaction in question casting doubt on whether it constitutes a sale, the plaintiff must fail---In the same vein, if the circumstances lend themselves to multiple interpretations, the courts should be disinclined to favour a reading that does not classify the transaction as a sale. Kazi Sheharyar Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court along with Petitioner in person (in C.P.L.A. No. 4649 of 2022). Ahmed Ali, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in C.P.L.A. No. 561 of 2023). Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 12th September, 2025.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497(1), third proviso---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 409, 419, 420, 468, 471, 472, 473, 109 & 34---Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947), S. 5(2)---Criminal breach of trust by public servant, cheating by personation, cheating and dishonestly inducing someone to deliver property, forgery for the purpose of cheating, use of a forged document as genuine, counterfeit seals, making or possessing a counterfeit seal or instrument with the intent to commit forgery, abetment, common intention, criminal misconduct---Statutory delay in conclusion of trial---Accused sought their bail on the ground of delay in conclusion of trial---Held: Allegations against the accused-petitioners were that they being Administrators and Officers of the Cooperative Societies Department, in active connivance with a land grabber illegally usurped the Society, misplaced original records, filed fake memberships before Court, engineered elections in September 2020 and installed a dummy management, thereafter, bogus plot files were prepared and sold to the public, crime proceeds of approx. Rs.130 million were laundered through various accounts and two properties were purchased in an other Society---In the instant case, the applicants were charged with offences punishable under Ss.409/419/420/ 471/472/473/109/34, P.P.C. read with S.5(2) PCA-II, 1947, which were not punishable up to death, hence their bail plea was covered under part(a) of the third proviso to S.497(1), Cr.P.C.---Said provision provided that if an accused remained detained exceeding one year without conclusion of trial, the law mandated his release on bail---For the purposes of commencement of time under the third proviso to S.497(1), Cr.P.C., period for the conclusion of the trial was to be calculated from the date of the arrest/detention of the accused and it was of little importance as to when the charge was framed and the trial commenced---In the absence of any material to the effect that the applicants were previously convicted, on a tentative assessment, the applicants did not appear to fall under the parameters of hardened, desperate or dangerous criminals---Certified copies of diaries of the Trial Court as available on record also clearly depicted that delay had not been caused in trial due to act or omission from the side of the applicant/accused---Both the applicants were arrested on 16.05.2024 and had remained detained since past more than one year and three months---Prosecutor informed that there were total number of 26 accused involved in this case out of which 6 had absconded whereas 18 accused persons had already been granted bails on different grounds and only present two applicants were presently behind bars---Prosecutor further informed about the position of the trial that 'Charge' had not been framed as yet, whereas the Court was presently vacant---In these circumstances, it appeared that the trial had not even commenced as yet, and the same was not likely to conclude in near future---On a tentative assessment, a case for grant of bail on the ground of statutory delay in the conclusion of trial was prima facie made out within the ambit of S.497, Cr.P.C.---Bail application was allowed, in circumstances. Nadeem Samson v. the state and others PLD 2022 SC 142; Shakeel Shah v. The State and others 2022 SCMR 1; Muhammad Usman v. The State and another 2024 SCMR 28; Nazir Hussain v. Zia-ul-Haq and others 1983 SCMR 72; Moundar and others v. The State PLD 1990 SC 934; Sher Ali alias Sheri v. The State 1998 SCMR 190; Akhtar Abbas v. State PLD 1982 SC 424; Abdul Rashid v. The State 1998 SCMR 897; Zahid Hussain Shah v. The State PLD 1995 SC 49; Muhammad Siddique v. Muhammad Behram and another 1998 PCr.LJ 358; Allah Wasaya v. The State and others PLD 2022 SC 541; Shahzad Ahmed v. The State through FIA Islamabad 2010 SCMR 1221; Shameel Ahmed v. The State 2009 SCMR 174; Riaz Ahmed and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Chairman, National Accountability Bureau NAB and others 2021 PCr.LJ 1182 and Tallat Ishaq v. National Accountability Bureau through Chairman PLD 2019 SC 112 rel. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Bail order---Observations of the Court---Scope---Observations made in bail order being tentative in nature, should not influence the Trial Court to independently adjudicate the case on its own merits. Nisar Ahmed Tarar for Applicants (in Criminal Bail Application No. 1514 of 2025). Saad Fayaz for Applicant (in Criminal Bail Application No. 1519 of 2025). Muhammad Najeeb Jamali for the Complainant (in Criminal Bail Applications Nos. 1514 and 1519 of 2025). Muhammad Ahmed, Assistant Attorney General for the State. Date of hearing: 21st August, 2025. Muhammad Hasan (Akber), J .--- Through this single order, both the subject bail applications are being decided which have been filed against the common order dated 02.06.2025 passed by learned Special Judge, `(Central-II), Karachi in FIR No.16/2024, registered under Sections 409/419/420/468/471/472/473/109/34 P.P.C read with Section 5(2) PCA-II, 1947 at Police Station F.I.A ACC, Karachi, whereby post a risk bill to both the applicants has been rejected.

Summary: Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011)--- ----Ss.6 & 7---Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 (New York Convention), Art. V---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.10A---Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award---Audi alteram partem, principle of---Applicability---Applicant sought enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award passed against respondent company---Plea raised by respondent company was that it was not provided proper opportunity of contesting the arbitration proceedings---Validity---Scope of legal maxim audi alteram partem read with Article 10A of the Constitution requires that everyone is entitled to a fair trial and due process, which includes basic right to be heard---Even in the objections nothing had been said as to the merits of the case and default committed by respondent-Company in paying outstanding amount---All steps were taken by respondent company to delay the proceedings before Tribunal, as it had no case on merits---High Court recognized the foreign award as binding and enforceable---Applicant was granted judgment in the amount mentioned in foreign award in question, which shall be executed as a decree of this Court---High Court directed the office to prepare a decree and converted the proceedings into execution proceedings under O.XXI, C.P.C.---Award was enforced accordingly. Taisei Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. v. A.M. Construction Company (Pvt.) Ltd. and another 2024 SCMR 640; Abdullah v. Messrs CNAN Group SPA through Chief Executive/ Managing Director and another PLD 2014 Sindh 349; Orient Power Company (Private) Limited v. Sui Southern Gas Pipelines Limited 2021 SCMR 1728; POSCO International Corporation v. RIKANS International and 4 others 2023 CLD 189; Messrs TRADHOL International SA Sociedad Unipersonal v. Messrs Shakarganj Limited PLD 2023 Lah. 621; Federal Government Employees Housing Authority through Director General, Islamabad v. Ednan Syed and others PLD 2025 SC 11; Federal Government Employees Housing Authority v. Ednan Syed PLD 2025 SC 11 and Parsons and Whittermore Overseas Inc v. RAKTA 508 F.2d 969 (1974) ref. Abdallah Azzaam Naqvi and Waqar Ahmed for Applicant. Abdul Ahad Nadeem Ammar Suria for Respondent. Dates of hearing: 7th and 19th May, 2025.

Summary: Whether the Additional District Judge decided the appeal or revision against an order, further revision was not maintainable before the High Court. The Office Objection is accordingly sustained.

Summary: The legal position of "State Subjects" as provided in Section 14B of the Act, 1951 was originally defined through the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Notification No. 1-L/84 dated 20.04.1927, which established a distinct legal identity for persons domiciled in the State. After the creation of AJ & K, this recognition was preserved through subsequent enactments, in 1974, the Interim Constitution of AJ&K reaffirmed this position by expressly incorporating the definition of "State Subject," thereby ensuring continuity of the historical status of AJ&K subjects