Summary: Furthermore, Section 179(4) of the Act empowers the FBR to regulate the system of adjudication, including the transfer of cases and the extension of time in exceptional circumstances.(at the relevant time in of Tax year 2016) However, for such an exceptional extension to carry legal effect, requisite approval must be obtained within the statutory timeframe prescribed under Section 179(3) of the Act. Once the mandatory period provided therein lapses, any subsequent extension granted by the Federal Board of Revenue is without legal force. Consequently, the Order-in-Original dated 07.04.2016 is time-barred, and the proceedings initiated through the Show Cause Notice could not lawfully continue beyond the expiry of the prescribed limitation period, As reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in judgment M/s Commander Agro (Private) Limited (supra). Operative part whereof is reproduced as under: - "5. Since, in terms of the above calculation the order was passed much beyond the time limits and even the alleged extension was much beyond the limit prescribed, (as it ought to have been extended, if at all, within the time frame), leaving the decision that is order-in-original as time barred and consequently the proceedings under the aforesaid show cause notice could not continue anymore."

Summary: When the matter is remanded by the Tribunal and no conclusive finding is holding the field, it does not give rise to any question of law for determination by this Court as the matter is wide open which will be decided by the Assessing Authority including Tribunal and thereafter the matter will be matured for expression of opinion by this Court in Reference Application. In above circumstances Reference Application is not maintainable against the remand order. 273Tax (Writ) 4404/21 Ms Chenab Engineering Works & Foundries Pvt Ltd Vs Federation of Pakistan etc. Mr. Justice Malik Javid Iqbal Wains 15-09- 2025 2025 LHC 5752

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Writ Petition under Article 199 of Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. Allotment of evacuee land made under Settlement Law was cancelled. Subsequent purchaser from the original allottee moved an application for purchase of said land. After the promulgation of Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) (Amendment) Act, 2022, all the evacuee properties stood transfer to the Provincial Government for its utilization of public purposes whereas the Chief Settlement Commissioner / notified officer or the Full Board has no power to allot or dispose of the evacuee land. Writ Petition dismissed. 271Criminal Proceedings 46183/25 Punjab Food Authority through Muhammad Asim Javaid Vs Syed Zeeshan Ahmed etc Justice Abher Gul Khan 16- 09- 2025 2025 LHC 5598

Summary: Woman can commit suicide with gunshot. 270Writ Petition- Settlement- Land Settlement Act 5742-15 DR PIR BUX KHAN ETC VS POP ETC Mr. Justice Ch. Muhammad Iqbal 16- 09- 2025 2025 LHC 5797

Summary: Section 115 CPC- Suit for recovery in pursuance of a foreign decree---Under Section 13 & 14 C.P.C presumption of validity is attached to the foreign decree if the said dictum complies with the conditions of aforesaid provisions of law, when the matter was directly and conclusively adjudicated between the same parties in the foreign jurisdiction which create a valid right in favour of the said decree holder. Civil Revision of foreign decree / judgment debtor is dismissed with heavy cost. 269Crl. Appeal 47572/23 Jamroz Khan Vs The State etc. Mr. Justice Muhammad Amjad Rafiq 16- 09- 2025 2025 LHC 5787

Summary: Furthermore, Section 179(4) of the Act empowers the FBR to regulate the system of adjudication, including the transfer of cases and the extension of time in exceptional circumstances.(at the relevant time in of Tax year 2016) However, for such an exceptional extension to carry legal effect, requisite approval must be obtained within the statutory timeframe prescribed under Section 179(3) of the Act. Once the mandatory period provided therein lapses, any subsequent extension granted by the Federal Board of Revenue is without legal force. Consequently, the Order-in-Original dated 07.04.2016 is time-barred, and the proceedings initiated through the Show Cause Notice could not lawfully continue beyond the expiry of the prescribed limitation period, As reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in judgment M/s Commander Agro (Private) Limited (supra). Operative part whereof is reproduced as under: - "5. Since, in terms of the above calculation the order was passed much beyond the time limits and even the alleged extension was much beyond the limit prescribed, (as it ought to have been extended, if at all, within the time frame), leaving the decision that is order- in-original as time barred and consequently the proceedings under the aforesaid show cause notice could not continue anymore." 268Civil Revision- Civil Revision (Against Decree)- Suit for Recovery 243-25 NIAZ HUSSAIN VS FAZAL FAREED ETC Mr. Justice Ch. Muhammad Iqbal 16- 09- 2025 2025 LHC 5894

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 148, 149, 337-F(iii), 109—Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 342—Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art. 129(g)—Murder and hurt—Aggressor theory—Benefit of doubt. For one deceased and one injured, twelve persons were implicated. The incident occurred in front of the co-accused’s house; several members of the accused party also sustained firearm injuries, one medically verified and others admitted by the investigating officer. Prosecution suppressed this material fact, undermining its credibility. The admitted presence of injuries on accused persons and the location of occurrence near their house made it probable that the complainant party was the aggressor. Suppression of such evidence rendered the prosecution witnesses untrustworthy. Muhammad Yaqoob v. Manzoor Hussain (2008 SCMR 1549), Ghulam Nabi v. Ikram alias Kama (2020 SCMR 477), Muhammad Iqbal v. Abid Hussain (1994 SCMR 1928), Nasrullah v. State (1985 SCMR 1715) and Muhammad Ramzan v. State (2021 SCMR 655) relied upon. (b) Recovery and forensic corroboration—Empties deposited after arrest—Evidentiary value. Recovery of 12-bore gun and PFSA report were disbelieved where empties were recovered on 23-08-2012 but deposited in the forensic laboratory on 28-08-2012, after the appellant’s arrest. Such sequence made the forensic link doubtful. Muhammad Amin v. State (2019 SCMR 2057) and Asad Rehmat v. State (2019 SCMR 1156) followed. (c) Motive—Joint and unproved. Prosecution alleged a quarrel and exchange of abuses two days earlier as common motive against all accused. Ten co-accused had already been acquitted and no specific motive was attributed to the appellant. High Court had also disbelieved motive. Absence of motive further weakened prosecution case. (d) Defence plea—Standard of proof. Where the accused demonstrates reasonable possibility of an alternate version, even by cross-examination or admitted circumstances, benefit of doubt must follow. Defence is not required to prove its plea beyond reasonable doubt; it suffices to create reasonable doubt in prosecution story. Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. State (PLD 2009 SC 814), Rashid Ahmad v. State (2001 SCMR 41), and Muhammad Nazir v. Tariq (1992 SCMR 1983) referred. (e) Prosecution witnesses—Unreliability due to suppression of material facts. Prosecution’s failure to disclose injuries on accused side, coupled with inconsistencies in recoveries and motive, demonstrated deliberate suppression, warranting rejection of their testimony. (f) Benefit of doubt—Principle reaffirmed. If a single circumstance creates reasonable doubt, the accused must be acquitted; here, numerous infirmities rendered the case doubtful. Tariq Pervez v. State (1995 SCMR 1345) and Muhammad Akram v. State (2009 SCMR 230) applied. Disposition: Crl. A. No. 57 of 2021 allowed—Trial Court and High Court judgments dated 27-03-2017 and 19-11-2018 set aside—Iftikhar Ahmed alias Papu acquitted of all charges and to be released forthwith unless required in another case. Crl. A. No. 58 of 2021 (for enhancement/against acquittal) dismissed.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) — Ss. 497(1) & 497(2) — Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860) — Ss. 337-A(iii), 337-L(2), 337-N(2), 148 & 149 — Post-arrest bail — Scope and considerations. Where an injury falling under S. 337-A(iii), P.P.C. (Shajjah-i-Hashimah) was attributed to the accused, the High Court declined bail solely on the ground that the case fell within the prohibitory clause of S. 497(1), Cr.P.C. — Held, that such approach was erroneous. The medical certificate merely reflected “external nasal deformity and bony crepitus,” and under S. 337-N(2), P.P.C., imprisonment by way of Ta’zir may only be imposed if the offender is shown to be a previous convict, habitual, hardened, desperate, or dangerous criminal, or if the act was committed in the name or on the pretext of honour. — In the absence of such findings by the trial or appellate courts, no lawful imprisonment under Ta’zir could be imposed. — Consequently, the case of the petitioner attracted S. 337-N(2), P.P.C., making his incarceration unjustified at the bail stage. — Reliance placed on Abdul Wahab v. The State (2019 SCMR 516). (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) — S. 497(2) — Further inquiry — Grant of bail. Held, that the question whether S. 337-A(iii) P.P.C. truly attracted the prohibitory clause required further inquiry under S. 497(2), Cr.P.C., particularly when the petitioner was in custody since 24-04-2025, no recovery was to be made from him, and trial proceedings were unlikely to conclude soon. The unexplained 14-day delay in lodging the F.I.R. prima facie rendered the prosecution’s version doubtful and susceptible to deliberation or consultation. Background of prior enmity between parties reinforced the requirement of cautious judicial scrutiny. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) — S. 497 — Principle of consistency — Co-accused granted bail. Where a co-accused in the same case had already been granted bail, the petitioner was entitled to the same concession on grounds of consistency, there being no distinguishing features. (d) Criminal law — Bail as a rule and refusal as exception. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the gravity or heinousness of an alleged offence alone is not a sufficient ground for refusal of bail if the circumstances otherwise call for further inquiry into the guilt of the accused. Bail cannot be withheld as a substitute for punishment. Reference made to Husnain Mustafa v. The State (2019 SCMR 1914). (e) Delay in lodging F.I.R. — Effect. An unexplained delay of 14 days in registration of F.I.R. undermined the spontaneity of the occurrence, introduced doubt about the prosecution story, and created room for deliberation and fabrication — such delay strengthened the case for bail. (f) Disposition. — Petition converted into appeal and allowed. — Orders of the courts below set aside. — Petitioner admitted to post-arrest bail on furnishing surety bond of Rs.100,000/- with two sureties in the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial court. — Prosecution at liberty to seek cancellation of bail in case of misuse. — Observations made were tentative and confined to bail determination. Held: Petition allowed; bail granted.

Summary: (a) Sales Tax Act, 1990 ----S. 47---Reference to High Court—Maintainability—Remand order of Appellate Tribunal—Scope and effect—No question of law arises from a remand order—Where the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR) remands a matter to the Adjudicating Officer for factual verification or fresh decision, such an order does not constitute a final adjudication on merits and, therefore, gives rise to no question of law for consideration under S.47 of the Act—Reference filed against a remand order is premature and misconceived. Cited Cases: • Haji Muhammad Yousaf v. Commissioner of Income Tax & Wealth Tax (2006 PTD 72) • M/s E.M. Oil Mills & Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax (2001 PTD 2708) • Commissioner of Income Tax v. Electronic Industries Ltd. (1988 PTD 111) • The Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Zone ‘B’, Karachi v. Messrs Electronic Industries Ltd. (1988 PTD 111) • Commissioner of Income Tax v. Bihar Alloy Steels Ltd. (1995 PTD 1189) • Commissioner of Income Tax & Wealth Tax, Sialkot Zone v. Messrs Maqsood Ahmad Gill (2007 PTD 1757) • M/s Bostan International v. Commissioner of Income Tax & Wealth Tax (2010 PTD 1275) • Dr. Abdul Rauf Hamid v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Faisalabad (65 Tax 207) (b) Reference jurisdiction—Interlocutory and non-final orders—Legal principle—Reference to High Court under S.47 lies only against final orders of the Tribunal wherein a substantial question of law arises—Interlocutory or procedural orders, including those remanding matters for verification or reassessment, are not referable—The legislative intent embodied in S.47(1) expressly confines High Court jurisdiction to questions of law emerging from conclusive findings, not preliminary or factual directions. (c) Sales Tax Act, 1990 ----S. 2(46), Proviso—Valuation of supply—Applicability of SRO 501(I)/2023—Remand for factual verification—Where the Tribunal directs factual determination as to whether raw material is imported or locally produced for the purpose of applying or excluding the SRO, the order remains open-ended and does not conclusively determine rights of the parties—Hence, reference does not lie at such stage. (g) Disposition— Reference application held not maintainable—Declined in limine—Question of law raised answered in the negative—Matter remanded to Adjudicating Officer to proceed in accordance with law after factual verification.